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ity are to use external auditors in a more systematic way than was the case with the Financial
Services Authority. The use of external auditors is not new. This paper evaluates the U.K experi-
ence and international use of external auditors in bank supervision. It suggests the current U.K
approach does not go far enough in explaining how external auditors in bank supervision will be
used, and this could lead to a possible expectations gap in banking supervision. This is suggested to
be the case in light of the limited levels of accountability and oversight over the auditing profession.
To overcome the expectations gap, the paper proposes some further ideas from the international
experience of using external auditors in order to improve the way we use external auditors and
manage the different roles and interests such auditors have in a twin private and public role. It is
suggested those ideas and proposals would go some way to improve how external auditors are used in
bank supervision: to better coordinate intense judgment-based supervision between the regulator-
bloodhound and the auditor-watchdog. The paper argues that the level of reliance on third parties,
such as external auditors, to undertake regulatory and supervisory tasks needs to be worked out in
advance to efficiently allocate regulatory resources rather than leaving it in an ad hoc manner.
I. Introduction
The use of external auditors has been brought to the fore recently as part of the United
Kingdom's reforms since the banking crisis. The Treasury Committee has, in this post-
mortem, recommended better use of "audit knowledge."' It now appears the avoidance of
direct criticism during the banking crisis has merited the revival of external auditors in
banking supervision to assist the new Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and Finan-
cial Conduct Authority (FCA) and, indeed, the Bank of England as the separate role of
supervisor of Central Counterparties (CCPs). 2 The recent suggestion by the Bank of En-
gland that the relationship between external auditors and the Financial Services Authority
(FSA) had "broken down" somewhat obscures and simplifies the point about the past.3 I
will establish, post the Barings Bank failure in 1995, that a considerable level of mistrust
existed in financial regulatory circles, and that subsequently the FSA followed the foot-
steps of the Bank of England and moved away from relying on external auditors to under-
take on-site supervision. 4 Whether the current approach makes better use of "audit
knowledge" is called into question. This is analyzed in light of the international experi-
ence of using external auditors in financial supervision. It is suggested that the United
Kingdom's approach to using external auditors does not go far enough to define the reli-
ance the PRA, FCA, and indeed the Bank of England will place on them to form a coher-
ent supervisory strategy to protect depositors and financial stability and could create an
1. TREASURY COMMITTEE, BANKING CRISIS: REFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PAY IN THE
CrrY, 2008-9, H.C. 519, at 81 (U.K), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2008O9/cm
select/cmtreasy/519/519.pdf.
2. HM TREASURY, A NEw APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM,
2011, Cm. 8083, at 7 (U.K.), available at https://www.gov.uk/govermnent/uploads/system/uploads/attach
mentdata/file/81403/consult-finreg-newapproachblueprint.pdf.
3. Cf BANK OF ENG. & FIN. SERVS. AuTH., THE BANK OF ENGLAND, PRUDENTIAL REGULATION Au-
THORITY: OUR APPROACH TO BANKING SUPERVISION, 14 (2011), available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/
publications/other/financialstability/uk reg-framework/pra-approach.pdf.
4. This evidence seems to conflict with the finding of Peter 0. Russell and Ian P. Dewing. See Peter 0.
Russell & Ian P. Dewing, The Contrasting Role ofAuditors in UK and Swiss Banking Supervision, THE INST. OF
CHARTERED AccS. OF SCOTLAND (2010), icas.org.uk/res/dewing_.russelLexec-summ-dec_2010.pdf.
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expectation in bank supervision. The uncertainty associated with the level of reliance the
regulators seek to place on external auditors is exacerbated by the lack of confidence in the
level of accountability and oversight of the general accounting and auditing profession.
The paper also revisits some of the unintended consequences of using external auditors in
the supervision of banks.
The paper will assess holistically the measures introduced recently to improve the use of
external auditors in bank regulation and supervision.5 It argues the relationship between
the regulator and auditor requires a formal structure to best utilize what the external audi-
tor can offer the supervisory process-so it can act as a "supervisory gatekeeper." A for-
mal, structured relationship would go some way to mitigate risks of ambiguity and
inconsistency associated with the informal, discretion-based approach currently offered.
A formalized and structured approach is suggested to provide some degree of coherency to
the relationship of regulator and auditor-to deal with the challenges banks pose to regu-
lators and external auditors during the life of a bank and indeed during times of distress.
The second part introduces the idea of an external auditor acting as supervisory gate-
keeper in bank supervision and the principal features of bank supervision. The third part
explores how the Bank of England and FSA used external auditors as supervisory gate-
keepers and the relationship between them and external auditors. The fourth part sets out
and analyzes the key features of the new reforms; notably, the revised Audit Practice Note
19, the memorandum of understanding (MOU), and the code of conduct relating to bilat-
eral and trilateral meetings (meetings between the regulator and external auditor; and
regulator, external auditor, and the individual bank, respectively). It is suggested that re-
establishing the relationship between the regulator and external auditor does not go far
enough, and if the regulator is going to rely on external auditors, then measures need to
be put in place to mitigate some of the underlying issues of external auditor independence
and accountability. More importantly, what is actually expected of the external auditor as
a "supervisory gatekeeper" is explored here and further in the paper. The fifth part looks
at the issue of qualifying financial accounts and the role of external auditors when banks
are in distress and may require emergency liquidity assistance. Part six looks at the extent
to which external auditors are accountable to the professional bodies. It is argued that the
profession may not be meeting the expectations of the PRA or FCA of being a more
intensive regulator. A historical examination is undertaken of some of the key tribunal
decisions and of the recent decision in December 2011 to fine PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP (PwC) £1.4 million for its failures concerning reports to the FSA of the segregation
of client assets at J.P. Morgan Securities Limited Client Money (JPMSL). The general
conclusion of the tribunal in the case draws specific attention to the limited sanctioning
regime of the accounting profession. The conclusions imply the sanctioning regime is
simply out of line with the enforcement regime regulators are expected to have in place to
safeguard the public interest. Finally, in part seven, a review of the international experi-
ence of using external auditors is provided, and further improvements to the way external
auditors are incorporated in banking supervision are suggested. These ideas and sugges-
tions primarily look at the way the regulator and the external auditor work together to
oversee a bank's activities while undertaking their responsibilities: the regulator in terms
5. The paper refers to banks and bank supervision for simplicity. The author is aware that external audi-
tors are used widely in financial supervision.
SUMMER 2013
68 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
of future "performance" and the external auditor in terms of past "performance" of a bank.
The international experience offers ideas around the structuring of the relationship and
also how the regulators and the external auditors can best work together during times of
distress.
H. The Supervisory Gatekeeper and Bank Supervision
In the context of bank supervision, the external auditor is referred to here as a "supervi-
sory gatekeeper," as distinct from the gatekeeper role generally; the term was first coined
by Kraakman.6 In the context of bank supervision, the external auditor as a supervisory
gatekeeper has additional responsibilities and interests to serve. These are distinct from
the role of the external auditor generally of expressing a view about the stewardship of a
corporation in line with accounting standards. The capital markets rely primarily on the
work of the Big 4 for a variety of areas, such as audit opinions, tax, and advisory services7
and this has generated a considerable amount of reliance on their services by the markets
as well as scrutiny when those views are found to be wanting.8 Moreover, the level of
reliance markets can place on the assurances attached to, for instance, audited accounts is
6. Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. EcoN. &
ORG. 53, 53 (1986), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/764916; see also, John C. Coffee, Understanding
Enron: It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid, 57 Bus. L. 1403, 1405 (2001).
7. The Big 4 firms dominate the provision of advisory, tax, and auditing services in the U.K. and have a
dominant global network as well. The following turnover of the Big 4 reflects this position: KPMG 1 707m,
PwC 92461m, Deloitte 22098m, and Ernst & Young 91465m. COMPETITION CoMM'N, STATUTORY AUDIT
SERVICES MARKET INVESTIGATION: THE SUPPLIERS OF STATUTORY AUDIT SERVICES To LARGE COMPA-
NIEs, 5, available at http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/assets/competitioncommission/docs/2011/
statutory-audit-services/suppliersof.statutory-auditservices_toargecompanies wp.pdf (last visited Aug.
14, 2013). The following proportion of their turnover from assurance services specifically auditing is a signif-
icant part of those totals: KPMG £456m, PwC £909m, Deloitte 2652m, and Ernst & Young 2444m. AUDIT
INSPECTION UNIT, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, PUBLIC REPORT ON THE 2011/12 INSPECTION OF KPMG
LLP AND KPMG AUDIT PLC 3 (2012), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/AIU/
Public-Report-on-the-2011-12-inspection-of-KPMG-LL.aspx [hereinafter KPMG REPORT]; AUDIT IN-
SPECTION UNIT, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, PUBLIC REPORT ON THE 2011/12 INSPECTION OF PRICE-
WATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP 3 (2012), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/AIU/
Public-Report-on-the-2011-12-inspection-of-Pricewa.aspx [hereinafter PwC REPORT]; AUDIT INSPECTION
UNrr, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, PUBLIC REPORT ON THE 2011/12 INSPECTION OF DELOITTE LLP 3
(2012), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/AIU/Public-Report-on-the-2011-12-in
spection-of-Deloitt.aspx [hereinafter DELOITTE REPORT]; AUDIT INSPECTION UNIT, FIN. REPORTING
COUNCIL, PUBLIC REPORT ON THE 2011/12 INSPECTION OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP 3 (2012), available at
http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/AIU/Public-Report-on-the-2011-12-inspection-of-Emst-Y.
aspx [hereinafter ERNST & YOUNG REPORT]. See also Helen Roxburgh, The Top 20 ofthe Accountancy World,
ECONOMIA (Feb. 1, 2012), http://economia.icaew.com/news/the-top-20-of-the-accountancy-world. It is no
surprise these Big 4 dominate the audit market for the U.K. FTSE-100 and the FTSE-250 companies in the
United Kingdom, as follows: KPMG 21 FTSE-100 and 49 FTSE-250 companies, PwC 37 FTSE-100 and 63
FTSE-250 companies, Deloitte 19 FTSE-100 and 62 FTSE-250 companies, and Ernst & Young 21 FTSE-
100 and 49 FTSE-250 companies. KPMG REPORT, supra, at 4; PwC REPORT, supra, at 4; DELOITE RE-
PORT, supra, at 4; ERNST & YOUNG, supra, at 4.
8. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REv. 323, 324
(2007).
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also limited with the passage of time as more up-to-date sources of information are pub-
lished that provide a better idea about the performance of the firm.9
The private relationship between the auditor and the client is a contractual relationship
that is set out in the audit engagement letter.' 0 Implicit in the relationship is the duty to
exercise the audit engagement with reasonable care and skill." But the auditor is not
required to enter the audit engagement with suspicion, but should undertake it on the
basis that if suspicion does exist, then an obligation exists to "probe it to the bottom." 2
When circumstances suggest the possibility of fraud or error, the degree of inquisitiveness
and skepticism should increase concomitantly and be expressed by seeking to obtain evi-
dence from independent sources to verify the evidence from the corporation. For exam-
ple, do the representations made by management indicate sufficient concern to a raise a
suspicion? 1 The auditor is primarily required to exercise skepticism only when audit evi-
dence gives rise to a suspicion that material misstatements may exist in the accounts and
not at the commencement of the audit. If such issues exist at the commencement of the
audit then they would influence the intensity and focus of the audit. The duty of care
would be breached if the auditor fails to investigate discrepancies when issues required
them to probe further.
The potential liability on external auditors for failure to undertake their responsibility
with reasonable care to audit the accounts of a client is much more straightforward in
comparison to their potential liability to a third party that may not be privy to the contrac-
tual relationship but relies on their findings.'1 In the United Kingdom, the law has devel-
oped in a class-by-class basis determined by the extent to which the work done for a client
is going to be relied on by a third party (like a regulator), and the third party is likely to
suffer loss as a result of the negligent work. Law Society v. KPMGI5 is an interesting case,
as it relates to the potential liability of a reporting accountant to the Law Society (as the
regulator of solicitors) for damages in the tort of negligence for the accountant's failure to
9. Berg & Sons & Co. Ltd. v. Mervyn Hampton Adams & others, [19931 B.C.L.C. 1045 (Q.B.) 1055
(Hobhouse J.) (U.K.).
10. Int'l Auditing and Assurance Standards Bd., Int'l Fed'n of Accountants, International Standard on Audit-
ing 210 Agreeing the Terms ofAudit Engagements, 103 (effective Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://www.ifac.
org/sites/default/files/downloads/a009-2010-iaasb-handbook-isa-210.pdf. These are said to be merely guides
to interpretation rather than instruments of legal responsibility. See generally Lloyd Cheyham & Co Ltd. v.
Littlejohn & Co, [1987] B.C.L.C. 303 (Q.B.) (U.K.); Esanda Fin. Corp. v. Peat Marwick Hungerfords, (1997]
AUST HIGHCT LEXIS 5 at 73 (referring to Columbia Coffee & Tea Pty Ltd. v. Churchill, [1992] 29
NSWLR 141).
11. In In re Kingston Cotton Mill, Vaughan Williams J. said there is "[n]o doubt he is acting antagonisti-
cally to the directors in the sense that he is appointed by the shareholders to be a check upon them." 11896] 1
Ch. 6 at 11 (U.K.).
12. In Re Kingston Cotton Mill Co. (No.2), [1896] 2 Ch. 279 at 288-89 (U.K.). The court needs to
consider whether the act or omission departs from "general practice." Krajl v. McGrath, [1986] 1 All E.R. 54
at 61 (U.K.).
13. Barings Futures Singapore v. Touche Singapore, [2002] All E.R. (D) Mar; see, e.g., AUDrr AND AsSUR-
ANCE FACULTY, MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATION LETTERs EXPLANATORY NOTE, Technical Release, Nov.
2002.
14. Caparo Industries PLC v. Dickman, [1990] UKHL 2 at 14, [1990) 2 A.C. 605 (appeal taken from Eng.).
15. Law Society v. KPMG Peat Marwick and Others, [2000] 4 All E.R. 540 [1[ 25] (Eng.). The Court of
Appeal decision in the case affirmed Vice Chancellor Sir Richard Scott's decision, thus cementing in principle
the expansion of the incremental approach of the tort for claims for economic loss by not restricting the duty
of care to cases where it is only "fair, just, and reasonable" to do so.
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qualify its report about a firm that was commissioned by the Law Society. In this case,
provisions of the Solicitors Act 1974 required the accountant to alert the Law Society to
the possibility of improprieties in the conduct of the solicitors' practice.16 According to
Sir Richard Scott, who wrote the original opinion, the relationship between the reporting
accountant and the Law Society was "sufficiently proximate" to warrant due care.' 7 While
the accounting industry may want to avoid a direct agency relationship, it might be impos-
sible in the circumstances when the financial regulator relies significantly on their work to
form regulatory decisions.
A. BANK SUPERVISOR AND EXTERNAL AUDITOR: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE INTERESTS
In the context of bank supervision, the bank regulator may require audited accounts
from the bank on an annual basis. The level of reliance placed on those accounts and on
the work of the external auditor can vary."' So much so that in some jurisdictions, not
only is the external auditor providing a view on the annual accounts of a ban-as they
would do for the market as a whole-but also may be required to also assist the regulator
in other ways, for instance to work with the regulator to oversee the bank and its activities
in the supervision process. This section of the paper will set out the way bank supervision
could be modeled in a jurisdiction and how the financial regulator and external auditor
work with one another. It primarily sets out, in the context of bank supervision, the public
and private interests of the financial regulator and the external auditor, respectively,
before exploring in detail the U.K. historical experience of using external auditors in bank
supervision.
The financial regulators and external auditors of banks seem to undertake similar func-
tions, while they broadly serve different purposes-public and private, respectively. The
regulator and the external auditor look at banks from different viewpoints, with the for-
mer attending to future viability and the latter to past performance and viability.' 9 The
interests they serve also diverge. The regulator is given statutory responsibility for regula-
tion and supervision of financial services, with the ultimate aim of protecting market con-
fidence and depositor and investor interests. "For example, the regulator is not necessarily
interested in how the bank is ensuring shareholder value, but is more concerned about
protecting the interests of depositors and investors."20 The external auditor, on the other
hand, serves the primary interests of company shareholders by expressing an opinion as to
whether the financial statements provide a "true and fair" view.21 As noted above, the
16. Id. at 540.
17. Id. 1 12.
18. Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int'l Settlements, The Relationship Between Banking
Supervisors and Banks' Erternal Auditors, 17 (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs87.pdf [here-
inafter Basel Comm.]; Joint Task Force, Int'l Auditing Prac. Comm. & Basel Supervisors' Comm., The Rela-
tionship Between Bank Supervisors and Erternal Auditors, 12 (Dec. 1987), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbs03b.pdf.
19. DALVINDER SINGH, BANKING REGULATION OF UK AND US FINANCIAL MAlucETs 153-78 (2007).
20. Id. at 153.
21. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 495(3) (U.K); see also LAWRENCE ROBERT DICKSEE, AUDITING: A
PRACTICAL MANUAL FOR AUDITORS (Arno Press 1976) (1892); MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDrr SOCIETY:
RIruALs OF VERIFICATION (2nd ed. 1999); Gene Brown, Changing Audit Objectives and Techniques, 37 THE
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private interests associated with risk capital of shareholders in comparison to the public
interests associated with compliance with prudential regulatory requirements means the
obligation on the regulator is set higher. To fulfill their respective responsibilities, the
regulator and external auditor undertake a process of verifying information and represen-
tations provided by the directors and management of a bank as to the information's accu-
racy and reliability. 22 A considerable level of reliance is placed on the bank to provide
accurate information, and specific enforcement actions are taken if the accuracy of the
information is found to be wanting.23 In the context of complex capital and liquidity
requirements, the need for accurate information is even more crucial. In the context of
the external auditor, these types of issues would be raised at board level and could, in an
extreme case, lead to discussions about whether or not the financial accounts should be
qualified or not.
In the banking sector, these issues have required a unique form of oversight by a sepa-
rate regulator that also has a continuing obligation to oversee the activities of a corpora-
tion and ensure it is managed prudentially to safeguard the interests of depositors and
wider system stability.24 In this respect, the financial regulator is another gatekeeper that
uses the external auditor as a supervisory gatekeeper for the corporation as well. The
regulator confers the right on the bank to undertake regulated business once certain pre-
conditions for authorization are fulfilled and there is reasonable assurance that those pre-
conditions will be continuously met.25 The bank is required to report regularly on its
activities and be open to on-site inspections. 26 But while the regulator provides the bank
with a license to undertake regulated activities, it does not explicitly certify and verify its
soundness in the form of a "going concern" statement, as an auditor is expected to do on
the basis of the financial statements. 27 A key feature of the bank regulator is that it can
deal with a range of regulatory failures using a range of enforcement powers. The exter-
nal auditor, on the other hand, has somewhat limited enforcement powers, the primary
one being the power to qualify or refuse to sign off on the accounts, which would signal to
the market that there are problems that call into question the accuracy of the financial
statements.28 The relationship between the regulator and the bank is continuous, which is
not the case between the bank and the external auditor. The regulator places its "reputa-
Accr. REv. 696, 703 (1962); Roy A. Chandler, John Richard Edwards & Malcolm Anderson, Changing Per-
ceptions of the Role of the Company Auditor, 1840-1940, 23 Accr. & Bus. REs. 443, 443 (1993); Josephine
Maltby, 'A Sort Of Guide, Philosopher And Friend': The Rise Of The Professional Auditor In Britain, 9:1 Accr.,
Bus. & FINAscIAL HISTORY 29, 33 (1999);JohnJ. Willingham, Discussant's Response to Relationship ofAuditing
Standards to Detection of Fraud, 45 CPA J. 13, 18 (1975).
22. See generally Companies Act, c. 46, §§ 393-394, 414.
23. See generally id. §§ 387 (duty to keep accounting records: offense), 414(4) (offenses for approval and
signing of accounts), 415(4) (offenses of the duty to prepare director's report), 418(5) (offenses for disclosure
to auditors in director's report), 419(3) (offenses for approval and signing of director's report), 425 (default in
sending out copies of accounts and reports: offenses), 429 (summary financial statements: offences), 451 (de-
fault in filing accounts and reports: offenses), 453 (civil penalty for failure to file accounts and reports), 463
(liability for false or misleading statements in reports), 501 (auditor's rights to information: offenses).
24. See generally Basel Comm., supra note 18, at 12.
25. Id. IT 30, 32.
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tional capital" at risk politically but not legally, as it is immune from private actions, 29
except those in bad faith.30 A loss of credibility can result in the loss of responsibilities, as
we have recently experienced. The bank is in a more precarious position, to an extent,
because it is placing reliance on the feedback from the regulator on its soundness through
compliance; if the regulator were to signal that it considers the bank compliant, then that
is a signal to the bank as a whole that things are going reasonably well. For example,
Northern Rock was given an extension to its next supervisory visit in light of its level of
compliance with regulatory requirements.3'
The model of oversight and supervision can be traditionally divided into on-site and
off-site approaches to supervision; but the demarcation between the two can be blurred, as
most jurisdictions tend to adopt a mixture of both models.32 The key element of an on-
site approach is the regulator or the auditor undertaking an assessment of the bank in
accordance with the requirements of authorization and continuous monitoring of capital,
large exposure requirements, internal controls, and management resources to oversee the
risks of the bank.33 This includes regular on-site examinations, both routine and ad hoc,
to ensure institutions are not simply orchestrating compliance for the on-site supervisory
inspection. 34 A significant amount of this time will be placed on interviewing key people,
namely the directors and senior management, and reviewing processes. 3s In off-site su-
pervision, reliance is placed on the reports banks are required to submit, whether on a
monthly, bi-quarterly, or annual basis.36 Those reports are reviewed by the regulator or
auditor, and an assessment is made on whether the bank is compliant or not.37 This forms
the basis for further dialogue with the bank regarding any concerns that may be identified.
A considerable level of weight is placed on accurate reporting.38 This enables the regula-
tor or external auditor to make an accurate assessment and possibly initiate enforcement
actions to deal with any failures.39
29. See Minories Fin. Ltd. v. Young, [19891 All E.R. 105 (Q.B.D.) 110 (U.K). Saville J. distinguishes the
relationship between the Bank of England and a bank and that between a nurse and mental patient, stating
"private banks in this country are commercial enterprises whose raison detre is to make profits though pro-
viding financial services. [Banks] may act prudently or imprudently, carefully or carelessly, and depending on
how good or bad they are as bankers they will make profits or losses. Unlike the mental patient, whose
responsibility for himself is diminished to such an extent that others must assume that responsibility, there is
nothing in the alleged relationship between the Bank of England and private banks ... to suggest that the
latter should be protected from themselves by the former. I take the view that there is nothing just or fair or
reasonable in making the Bank of England assume or share any part of the commercial responsibilities which
it can be said private banks owe to themselves to conduct their commercial dealings prudently and carefully so
as to make profits and avoid losses."
30. See generally Three Rivers DC v. Bank of England, [2001] All E.R. 269 (H.L.) (U.K.).
31. INTrERNAL AUDrr DrvIsoN, FIN. SERVs. AUTH., THE SUPERVISION OF NORTHERN RocK: A LES-
SONS LEARNED REVIEw, 3 (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubslother/nr-report.pdf In an
insolvency context relating to an insurance company, see Re Continental Assurance Co. of London PLC v.
Beckett, [2007] 2 B.C.L.C. 287 (Ch.) (U.K).
32. Basel Comm., supra note 18, 1 65.
33. Id. 1 39-41.
34. Id. 1 66.
35. Id. T 39.
36. Id. T 40.
37. Id.
38. Id. 154.
39. Id. T 53.
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The relationship between the regulator and the auditor can be either "indirect and im-
plicit" or "direct and explicit."40 In the former, the regulator places limited reliance on
the audited accounts that are simply expected to be submitted to the regulator to assist
with their assessment of the bank's current financial status. In the latter case, specific tasks
are undertaken by the auditor on the regulators' behalf, and reliance is placed on the
findings to make regulatory decisions.41 Moreover, the use of ad hoc external reports
commissioned by a regulator, called in the United Kingdom an s.166 skilled report, adds
another interesting paradox to the way supervision and investigations are conducted be-
causc it is neither purely on-site nor off-site. 42 In many respects, it is a privatization of
supervision with the use of external consultants (predominantly the big 4 accounting
firms) to undertake work on behalf of the regulator, meaning it is neither on-site nor off-
site.
In many respects, the use of external auditors in banking supervision is harnessing a
market tool for regulatory public ends. This has resulted in a large volume of external
consultancy work to assist firms to, for instance, prepare for regulatory visits. The roles of
the regulator and external auditor share some similarities, for instance, verifying the accu-
racy of the representations made by management.43 Whether there is a sufficient amount
of effort devoted to verification of the accuracy of those statements by the regulator and
external auditor is a different and somewhat more contentious matter. This paper sug-
gests that the regulator needs to ensure the model of supervision avoids either an over- or
under-accommodation of external auditors with more structure to the relationship and the
level of reliance placed on them. An expectations gap could arise when using external
auditors-which may be unrealistic, especially when auditors and regulators look at the
bank from different viewpoints, namely the past and the future respectively-and can be
equally prone to failure. The history of the bank is something the regulator should be
familiar with, so the utility of the audit for regulatory purposes is somewhat limited.
The financial crisis has highlighted the fact that the regulator and the external auditor
will need to focus more attention on the representations of management, verify the accu-
racy of these representations, and take a skeptical approach to such representations. It
appears both the regulator and the external auditor, to varying degrees, are prone to ac-
cept management representations with little critical assessment or indeed evidence to as-
sess whether the representations made by management can be substantiated with internal
or external evidence.44 The auditing field work undertaken by Trotman and Wright sug-
gest that more external evidence needs to be incorporated into the opinion-making pro-
cess rather than overly relying on internal evidence to verify management representations
40. I would like to thank Katia Hulster for this point that is explored extensively in the paper.
41. See Basel Comm., supra note 18, 191 46-55.
42. See generally Skilled Persons Reviews (sl66 and s166A), FiN. CoNDucr Atrr-noRrY (uly 31, 2013),
http-//www.fca.org.uk/about/what/regulating/how-we-supervise-firms/reports-by-skilled-persons. However,
it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore in great detail.
43. Basel Comm., supra note 18, 1 46.
44. The auditor is required to undertake the audit process with "professional skepticism" and "professional
judgment." The idea of "professional skepticism" underpins the audit, and in the literal sense, suggests a
"questioning mind" that does not accept the audit evidence at face value but questions the soundness of the
information and data given. A certain degree of vigilance builds on this by pointing out that the auditor needs
to be circumspect and cautious about accepting at face value audit evidence.
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that is exposed to the risk of being manipulated to meet their own interests.45 This could
mean that the regulator and external auditors could work more closely to better triangu-
late evidence from various sources, so that part of the external evidence external auditors
may require in order to verify the accuracy of management representations could be
gained from the regulator and vice-versa. Moreover, external data about a sector of the
industry could be used to evaluate the credibility of management representations. In such
circumstances, it could be information the regulator has about a competitor in the same
sector that suggests the representations made by another do not seem to reflect the busi-
ness realities of the sector as a whole and thus requires more scrutiny, as it appears to be
an outlier in comparison to the industry as a whole.
In this section, the broad public and private interests of supervision and auditing were
explored to go on to look at the U.K. approach of using external auditors in detail. The
following part traces how the level of reliance U.K. regulators placed on external auditors
changed due to a level of mistrust of external auditors. It then fleshes out the role of
external auditors and the relationship between banking supervisors and external auditors.
It argues the current proposals lack substance and could lead to coordination problems
between the bank supervision and external auditor.
III. The Use of External Auditors in the U.K.: Historical Context
The compulsory audit of bank financial statements was first introduced in the United
Kingdom with the Companies Act 1879, after the failure of City of Glasgow Bank.46 The
post-war period saw a move to build on the audit function, with greater emphasis on
disclosure policies complementing the audit. 47 This process continued later with the in-
troduction of the Bank Accounts Directive48 and through the work of the Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision.49 The Banking Act 1987 formally introduced the role of the
external auditor in the supervision of banks after the Johnson Matthey affair,so from which
point the role of the auditor grew in terms of involvement in banking supervision. The
Bank of England model of regulation and supervision relied heavily on external auditors,
including their role of reporting accountant, to assist it in its decision-making.5 The
heavy dependence on external auditors brought a considerable level of criticism after the
45. Ken T. Trotman & William F. Wright, Triangulation of Audit Evidence in Fraud Risk Assessments, 37
AccT., ORGs. & Soc'y 41, 52 (2012).
46. E. Cooper, Chartered Accountants as Auditors of Companies, 12 THE Accr. 644 (1886).
47. See generally COMPANY LAW COMMIYTEE, REPORT (THE "JENKINS COMMITTEE REPORT"), 1962,
Cmnd. 1749 (U.K), available at http://www.takeovers.gov.au/content/Resources/otherresources/downloads/
jenkins-committee.pdf.
48. Council Directive 86/635/EEC, 1986 Oj. (L 372) 1; The Companies Act 1985 (Bank Accounts) Regu-
lations, 1991, S.I. 2705 (U.K).
49. Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Bank for Int'l Settlements, Enhancing Bank Transparency: Public
Disclosure and Supervisory Information that Promote Safety and Soundness in Banking Systems, (Sept. 1998), availa-
ble at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs41.pdf; The Working Group on Transparency and Accountability, et. al.,
Int'l Monetary Fund, Summary of Reports on the International Financial Architecture, (Oct. 1998), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/g22/summry.pdf.
50. BANK OF ENG., THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUPERVISORS, AUDITORS AND MANAGEMENT OF
BANKS (1985).
51. Id.
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BCCI closure and later with the failures at Barings.52 A specific concern was that poor
audits of these firms undermined the capability of the supervisor to identify problems in a
timely manner, and thus put depositors' interests at risk.53
The introduction of the FSA in 1997 brought in what was considered to be a new
regime with a significant emphasis on on-site supervision, which was effectively a move
away from the Bank of England's approach of relying on external auditors for more tech-
nical reporting requirements. The experience just before the setting up of the FSA was
influenced by the Barings experience and the failure of the auditors at the time to pick up
on Nick Leeson's activities in Singapore when several red flags existed. 54 Moreover, the
introduction of a risk-based approach by the Bank of England after Barings resulted in
some decline in the number of reports completed by external auditors (explored more
fully below).55 The policy of using the external auditors of a bank to act in the capacity of
reporting accountants was subsequently reduced.56 A possible problem with this policy
reversal was that the FSA did not counter it with an increase in the number of staff to
supervise the financial system to offset the limited dialogue with external auditors and the
use of skilled persons' reports.57 But, as the figures for the number of reports commis-
52. Id.
53. Christopher Humphrey, Peter Moizer & Stuart Turley, The Audit Expectations Gap - Plus fa change, plus
c'est la mime chose?, 3 CRITICAL PERSP. ON AccT. 137 (1992); Anthony Puxty, Prem Sikka & Hugh Willmott,
Mediating Interests: The Accountancy Bodies' Responses to the McFarlane Report, 27 Accr. AND Bus. RES. 323, 339
(1997); Prem Sikka, Anthony Puxty, Hugh Willmott & Christine Cooper, The Impossibility of Eliminating the
Expectations Gap: Some Theory and Evidence, 9 CRTICAL PERSP. ON AccT. 299, 312 (1998). The U.S. Cohen
Commission in 1978 first brought to the public platform the idea of an "expectations gap." THE COMM'N
ON AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIEs, AM. INsT. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, THE COMIASSION ON
AUDITOR'S RESPONSIBILITIES: REPORT, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, (Apr. 1992) (reprinted in
the Journal of Accountancy).
54. These conflicts of interest were raised in the Arthur Andersen Report into banking supervision after
Barings Bank, which noted the concern of staff at Supervision and Surveillance about the independence of
reporting accountants. See ARTHUR ANDERSEN, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REVIEW OF
SUPERVISION AND SURVEILLANCE, 1996, at 13, T[ 68. Although the reporting accountant's role did not
figure in the Baring debacle, according to the Treasury Select Committee, the weaknesses that transpired
after the collapse of Barings questioned the capacity of a firm to provide both auditing roles. The committee
recommended that a bank should use a different firm, fully independent from the auditors of the financial
statements, to conduct the s.39 reports (Banking Act 1987). See also TREASURY COMMITTEE, BARINGs BANK
AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION, FIRST REPORT, 1996-97, at xii, T 22.
55. IAN P. DEWING & PETER 0. RUSSELL, THE ROLE OF AUDITORS AND REPORTING ACcoUNTANTs
AND SKILLED PERSONS IN UK FINANCIAL SERVICES SUPERVISION vii (2005) [hereinafter DEWING & Rus-
SELL, ROLE OF AUDITORS].
56. Id.
57. See Dalvinder Singh, Enforcement Methods and Sanction in Banking Regulation, 4 INT'L AND COMP.
CORP. L. J. 337 (2002). The s.166 skilled person report was not used to the same extent as its predecessor,
the reporting accountant s.39 reports-the predecessor of the skilled person reports. The recent, post-finan-
cial-crisis trend towards using skilled person reports, while high in comparison to the previous usage, does
not even remotely touch the numbers of s.39 reports the Bank of England was initiating. For example, in
1991-92 it commissioned 728 s.39 reports, 414 of which were on foreign branches (Banking Act Report,
1991/92, p. 26) and in 1992-93 there were 681 reports (Banking Act Report 1992/93, p. 33) followed by 620
in 1993-94 (Banking Act Report 1993/94, p. 33) and 610 in 1994-95 (Banking Act Report 1994/95, p. 36.).
However, after Barings and the introduction of risk-based regulation the number of s.39 reports commis-
sioned dropped by approximately 20-40 percent, to 482 in 1997, 391 in 1998, and 334 in 1999. Thus, the
move to reducing reliance on auditors started long before the establishment of the FSA, contrary to sugges-
tions by the Bank of England.
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sioned by the Bank of England show, the use of accountants to undertake the specific
reports declined significantly prior to the FSA taking on the responsibilities for regulation
and supervision.58 But the move toward on-site supervision by the FSA did not come with
additional resources to offset the reduced use of external auditors or the replacement of
the reporting accountants' ad hoc reports with the s.166 Skilled Person Reports.59 In-
deed, prior to the financial crisis there were even suggestions of actually reducing the level
of staff; this was quickly reversed post-Northern-Rock review.
A significant feature of the current reforms is re-establishing the dialogue between the
regulator and the auditor.60 It is suggested that simply re-establishing this relationship
does not go far enough because it does not make transparent the extent to which the
regulator will rely on the external auditor in terms of a "source of information" and "com-
pliance" with the regulators' rules.61 Moreover, regulators' reliance on the accounting
profession to hold external auditors accountable with professional standards may lead to
unintended consequences when the financial regulator is reluctant to hold external audi-
tors accountable, even when they have the authority.
IV. The Relationship Between the External Auditor and the Supervisor:
The Regulatory Reforms
The post-mortem of the financial crisis brought to the fore questions of whether the
external auditors should once more communicate formally with the financial regulator on
a more regular basis. The introduction of bilateral and trilateral meetings between the
regulator, external auditor, and banks to explore matters relating to supervision has been
the principal reform since the financial crisis in the context external audit and regulator
relations. 62 This was following the Treasury Committee recommendation to re-introduce
the meetings following the failures of the FSA as regulator and the minimal criticism
received by the external auditors during the financial crisis. This section explores (1) the
background to the relationship between the external auditor and the regulator and (2) the
bilateral and trilateral meetings. It is suggested the relatively limited guidance offered by
the recent reforms to improve the way the regulator and the external auditor work to-
gether leaves a considerable level of ambiguity.
58. SELECT COMMTfEE ON EcoNomic AFFAIRs, AuDrroeRs: MARKET CONCENTRATION AND THEIR
ROLE, 2011, H.L. 119-, 45 (UK). "The working relationship between external auditors and the prudential
supervisors had broken down in the period prior to the financial crisis. Prior to 2007, formal meetings
between supervisors and external auditors no longer formed part of the routine supervisory framework and
the informal channels of communication that existed when the Bank had responsibility for supervision had
fallen away. The FSA had also in this period made much less frequent use of skilled persons' reports as a
routine supervisory tool [these had been another innovation of the 1987 Act]. The regular meetings that
these had previously engendered helpfully reinforced the links between the auditor and supervisor."
59. As shown in the statistical evidence provided in note 57.
60. The Financial Services Act 2012 amends the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the Bank of
England Act 1998. Financial Services Act, 2012, c. 21, § 166, sch. 12 (U.K).
61. Financial Conduct Authority Handbook, Regulatory Processes, Supervision (SUP) 3.2.1G, FIN. CONDuCr
AuTHoRrrY, availabk at http://fshandbook.info/FS/htmli/handbook/SUP/3/2 (last visited Aug. 12, 2013)
[hereinafter SUP].
62. SUP, supra note 61, 2.3.1, 3.8.3.
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The financial crisis brought in a new regulatory framework to replace the FSA's single
regulatory authority with principally two regulators: the Prudential Regulation Authority
(PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).63 Furthermore, from a regulatory
standpoint the Bank of England is conferred a specific responsibility to supervise Central
Counterparties (CCPs).64 The two new regulators (the PRA and FCA) form the micro-
prudential arm of the official safety net, broadly speaking, and will have distinct roles as a
prudential regulator and a conduct of business regulator, respectively. The Bank of En-
gland, on the other hand, has the role of macro-prudential supervisor as the central bank
to fulfill its role as the overseer for financial stability.65 Bridging the relationship between
the macro-prudential regulations and the macro-prudential supervisor, the new regime
also introduces the Financial Policy Committee to link the two facets of the official safety
net together with the mandate of monitoring issues within the financial and economic
system that could pose systemic problems.66 While it is beyond the scope of this paper to
provide a detailed analysis of the regulatory structure, it suffices to say the new regulators
are expected to use external auditors to assist them in the task of supervising financial
institutions and exchanges to fulfill their regulatory and supervisory mandates. The legis-
lative reforms mandate the regulator and external auditor work together to oversee their
respective remits of the U.K. financial system, either through authorized persons or rec-
ognized investment exchanges.67
The Financial Services Act 2012 (FSA 2012) amends FSMA 2000 to provide a new
framework for the relationship between the regulator and auditor.68 The PRA is man-
dated to generally have in place arrangements to share information and opinions with the
external auditor.69 The new legislative framework enables the PRA to change the way it
works with the external auditor, providing it with a significant degree of flexibility. The
legislation requires the PRA to put in place a code of practice to articulate how it expects
to work with external auditors; the existing code of practice is explored below. 70 But the
new, amended FSMA 2000 gives the PRA the discretion to replace the code of practice
when it considers it necessary. 71 The provision enables the PRA to work out, as a new
regulator, how best to utilize external auditors in the supervision of banks and insurance
firms. 72 More specifically, the PRA is mandated to put in place rules the external auditor
is required to adhere to in order to enable it to cooperate with the PRA in the task of
supervision.73 The FCA is also given the power to enable it to change the duties the
external auditor needs to fulfill when cooperating with the FCA.74 The power to change
63. See Financial Services Act, c. 21, § 339, sch. 13.
64. Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 288 (U.K).
65. Bank of England Act, 1998, c. 11, § 11.
66. Id. § 13.
67. SUP, supra note 61, 5.1.1A.
68. For guidance, see the FCA and PRA Supervision Handbook. SUP, supra note 61, 3.2.1.
69. Financial Services Act, sch. 13, § 339A(l)(a)-(b).
70. See, e.g., Financial Services Handbook, APER, Statements of Principle and Code of Practice for Ap-
proved Persons.
71. Financial Services and Markets Act, c. 8, § 339A(2).
72. Financial Services Act, sch. 13, § 339A(2)-(7).
73. Financial Services and Markets Act, s. 340(3A)(a),(b)(i)(ii); Financial Services Act, sch. 13, 3 (4).
74. Financial Services and Markets Act, s. 340(3B); Financial Services Act, sch. 13, 3(4).
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the rules governing the use of external auditors needs to be considered "necessary or expe-
dient" for both the FCA and the PRA to advance their objectives. 75
The broad mandate in the amended FSMA 2000 provides a significant amount of dis-
cretion on the PRA and the FCA to work out how they expect to work with the external
auditor.76 The relationship between financial regulator and external auditor, as men-
tioned before, is not a new one. It is therefore opportune to explore how the relationship
has worked in the past. The following section explores the relationship and the current
code of practice that sets out how the regulator and the external auditor are expected to
work together.
The traditional relationship between external auditor and client is one of confidential-
ity, within which the auditor does not have the authority to communicate its findings to
others.77 But the financial services industry is an exception to that rule.7 8 It provides a
statutory duty for the auditors of a regulated entity to bring to the attention of the regula-
tor information they come across during the ordinary course of performing the audit. 79
Such information could include any matter considered relevant to the regulator's remit of
responsibility and any matter of material significance to the regulator. It takes into ac-
count the fact that information about the audit client can be obtained either directly or
indirectly when parties involved in the audit also act in another capacity for the client.80
As the auditor will have to seek further management representations and possibly inde-
pendent evidence to verify the accuracy of the representations, some form of disclosure to
the bank is inevitable. Whether a matter gives rise to a reasonable cause to communicate
it to the regulator is a matter determined by the external auditor.s1 In the past, external
auditors placed the onus implicitly on the firm to notify the regulator, so defeating the
object of the requirement on the auditor to act independently.82 In this respect, a form of
"regulatory tipping off" exists, which could imply a bank has been proactive in disclosing a
matter to the regulator when in fact it was suggested to the bank by the external auditor.83
The Bank of England, when it was responsible for bank supervision, first introduced
bilateral and trilateral meetings for auditors and banks with the introduction of the Bank-
ing Act of 1987.84 The bilateral and trilateral meetings with the external auditor and
reporting accountant gave the Bank the opportunity to discuss matters that it regarded as
pertinent to its understanding of a bank's business and any problems either the external
75. Financial Services and Markets Act, s. 340 (8)(a)-(b); Financial Services Act, sch. 13, 3(9).
76. See id.
77. Basel Comm., supra note 18, 1 63.
78. THE AUDITING PRACTICES BD., FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, PRACTICE NOTE 19 (REVISED): THE
AUDrI OF BANKS AND BUILDING SOCIETIES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, (Mar. 2011), http://www.frc.
org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/APB/PN-19-(Revised)-The-Audit-of-Banks-and-Building-So.aspx.
79. Basel Comm., supra note 18, IT 51-52.
80. Id.
81. FIN. SERVS. AUTH. & FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, DISCUSSION PAPER 10/3: ENHANCING THE AUDI-




83. Id. at 30. "The auditor's approach to report as described above, if true, suggests an emphasis on the
auditor-client relationship and client confidentiality in preference to disclosing information to a regulator in
the public interest."
84. See generally Banking Act, 1987, c. 39 (U.K.) (repealed).
VOL. 47, NO. I
A SUPERVISORY GATEKEEPER 79
auditor or the reporting accountant found to be necessary to bring to the Bank of En-
gland's attention.85 The tripartite meetings enabled the three parties to explore all the
competing issues with one another.86 The bilateral meetings certainly brought a degree of
tension, as the bank was not involved, so the Bank of England and the external auditor or
reporting accountant could be as frank as they considered necessary without the bank
possibly intervening. Trilateral meetings were a routine part of the dialogue between the
three parties, and post-Barings, the bilateral meeting also formed an annual part of the
process.87
The relationship between the bank and the auditor changes in these settings almost to a
point where the report by the auditor is: how good or bad is the bank? What the client
may consider confidential or of a sensitive nature meant the bank may like to manage what
the auditors would discuss in a pre-meeting as well as the possible responses to the find-
ings by the Bank of England. According to Tattersall, "experience of such meetings over a
number of years has suggested that they can be conducted without undue strain on rela-
tions between auditor and client, though they will obviously be more effective if regulator
and auditor feel able to speak frankly."88 The idea of being able to speak frankly possibly
led the Bank of England to introduce the bilateral meeting as a compulsory part of the
discussions between the various.parties. In an empirical study, Dewing and Russell under-
stood the ad hoc approach to bilateral meetings meant they were seen as serious events, so
the move to make them routine events meant banks were more sensitive to discussions
about them.89
The code of practice published by the former FSA in February 2011 continues within
the new regulatory framework. It sets out how the regulator, bank, and auditor are ex-
pected to work together.90 The code of practice refers to the importance of the auditor in
regulation, with an "open, cooperative and constructive relationship between the supervi-
sor and the auditor."91 It provides a limited degree of structure around the communica-
tion and cooperation between the auditor and regulator. For example, it is not clear what
information should be shared between auditor and supervisor, other than any information
or opinion on a matter that the auditor reasonably believes is relevant to any function of
the financial regulator.92 In many respects, it provides very little assistance beyond elabo-
rating on the existing audit and client relationship in very broad terms. Whether the code
adds value to the introduction of regulatory expectations is open to question.
A route map for formal dialogue between the auditor and the regulator is quite possibly
a first step to engage the auditor in bank supervision and builds on the duty to report.
The principles provide a very broad context for the parties to deal with one another, and it




88. John Tattersall,Auditing in the Financial Services Sector, in CURRENT ISSUES INAUDITING 299 (Michael
Sherer et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2007).
89. DEWING & RUSSELL, ROLE OF AUDITORS, supra note 55.
90. FIN. SERVICES AUTH., FINALISED GUIDANCE: CODE OF PRACTICE FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BE-
TWEEN THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR AND THE SUPERVISOR (May 2011), available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/gui
dance/fgi 1_09.pdf.
91. Id.
92. Financial Services and Markets Act, c. 8, § 342.
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decide what needs to be shared and when. The auditor is not expected to rely on the bank
to report findings, as in the past, so reneging on its responsibilities to report.93 This
transpired to be a regular occurrence when the statutory requirement expected auditors to
communicate with the regulator. 94 The external auditor's "regulatory tipping off" to the
bank to notify the regulator of material issues puts the bank in a more positive light. If an
investigation were initiated, the bank would have had the opportunity to reduce the sever-
ity of the possible enforcement sanction if it was seen to be cooperating with the regula-
tors by raising the alarm itself rather than leaving this to the external auditor to
communicate who first came across the issue. This is particularly important in the U.K.
context because formal cooperation with the regulator results in a reduction in any subse-
quent penalty. 95
Politicians seem to think external auditors will be another line of defense against bank
failure. But what the profession is proposing is much the same as the current audit ap-
proach and aims to avoid the idea of the external auditor being the supervisors' agent.96
Each party seems to have a misconceived idea of what each other expects and the level of
reliance the supervisor seeks to place on external auditors. While the PRA and FCA pro-
pose to question "business judgments" through a judgment-based approach to supervi-
sion, 97 the audit profession on the other hand seems to be reluctant to engage in the
93. ENHANCING THE AUorroR's CONTRIBUTION TO PRUDENTIAL REGULATION, rupra note 81.
94. Id.
95. See Financial Services and Markets Act, c. 8, §§ 206, 210 (provisions relating to the Regulator's discre-
don in imposing penalties).
96. Ass'N OF CHARTERED CERTIFIED ACCCOUNTANrTS, AUDIT UNDER FIRE: A REVIEW OF THE POST-
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRIES 13 (May 2011), available at http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/
global/PDF-technicallaudit-publications/pol-af-auf.pdf [hereinafter ACCA]. The paper provides: "Nonethe-
less, the distinct roles of regulator and auditor should never been confused. Auditors should never be seen as
agents of the regulator-this would change the relationship between auditor and client company to the detri-
ment of both."
97. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION Aurm., BANK OF ENG., THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHORITY'S
APPROACH TO BANKING SUPERVISION, (Apr. 2013), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publica
tions/Documents/praapproach/bankingapprl304.pdf [hereinafter PRA's APPROACH TO BANKING SUPERVI-
SION 20131; PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTH., BANK OF ENG., THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTHOR-
rY's APPROACH TO INSURANCE SUPERVISION, (Apr. 2013), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
publications/Documents/praapproach/insuranceapprl304.pdf; PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTH., BANK OF
ENG., THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTi iORiTY'S APPROACH To ENFORCEMENT: STATUTORY STATE-
MENTS OF POLICY AND PROCEDURE, THE BANK OF ENGLAND (Apr. 2013), available at http://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/pra/approachenforcement.pdf; Andrew Bailey, Exec.
Dir., Bank of Eng., Speech at The Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre, London: The Supervisory Ap-
proach of the Prudential Regulation Authority, (May 19, 2011), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
publications/Documents/speeches/2011/speech496.pdf. In contrast see, Ian Powell, chairman and senior
partner, PwC, explained: "It's not the job of the auditor presently to look at the business model of a business.
That is the job of management." He acknowledged, however, that in "undertaking an audit you do look at
the market conditions that were extant at the time of signing off the audit." THE HOUSE OF LORDs SELECT
COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, AUDITORS: MARKET CONCENTRATION AND THEIR ROLE, WRITTEN
EVIDENCE 40 (Mar. 30, 2011), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documentslords-committees/eco-
nomic-affairs/auditors/auditorswe.pdf. Furthermore, the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic
Affairs concluded that, "even at Northern Rock, when PwC concluded its audit for 2006 in January 2007 the
company 'had a history of profitable operations and had a track record of ready access to funds'. . . none of
the information available to us indicated anything that would constitute a 'material uncertainty'. . . we con-
cluded that in our opinion there were no matters relating to the going concern basis of accounting that were
required to be reported to shareholders." The FSA said, "Northern Rock, relative to its peers, [had] a high
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process of assessing business judgments. This follows the point explored before, which is
the external auditor needs to assess management representations with both external and
internal evidence. Auditors do not consider it their responsibility to judge business strat-
egy or other business decisions, as they are primarily considered to be the responsibility of
management. 98 Although external auditors do not want to explicitly take on the role of
assessing business strategy, it seems to be more the case that assessing business strategy
occurs implicitly in the external auditor's role because management representations about
business strategy are reviewed in the process of formulating an opinion on the financial
accounts. 9
If reliance is placed on the external auditor to undertake tasks for the regulator, then
surely their approach needs to coincide and it should be worked out what role they are
expected to perform in advance. Moreover, the auditor would be expected to look more
to the possible future performance of a bank rather than simply its past performance.
This could be a feature of the external auditor's role as a supervisory gatekeeper, making
them-for the purposes of the regulator-take a long-term view of the bank rather than
what is expected to fulfill the going-concern requirements. The flexibility offered in the
new legislation means new duties could be worked out to better enable external auditors
to act as supervisory gatekeepers. Whether those and the following issues could also be
worked into a new code is open to debate. A key issue would be working out how the
regulator and the external auditor can work together when a bank may be in distress. This
issue is explored further in the section below.
V. Qualification of Bank Accounts
The qualification of bank accounts had been a controversial area during the financial
crisis, as people started to ask why the banks had been given a clean bill of health when,
during the same year, they received vast amounts of public support to save them from
collapse. In the recent crisis, the banks that sought government assistance had received
unqualified audits shortly before the rescue. 00 In light of the financial circumstances and
the vulnerability of many banks at the time, it is necessary to ask whether the failure to
qualify bank accounts is a concern and, if so, how it can be managed so as to balance the
need for disclosure and limit the spill-over effects from a bank failure. In many respects,
the question of qualification brings to the fore the issue of audit focus on the past and the
regulators', and possibly the market's, concerns for the future. This is due to the auditors'
focus on past financial performance to gauge how it is likely to perform in the future.I0
Whereas the regulator is presented with "real-time" data and, on the basis of that infor-
public target for asset growth (15-25% year-on-year) and for profit growth; a low net interest margin; a low
cost: income ratio; and relatively high reliance on wholesale funding and securitisation." As a result of this
business model, it was able to increase its share of the UK mortgage market at an extraordinary rate. North-
ern Rock's market share of net residential lending jumped from 11.2 percent in 2004 to 18.9 percent in the
first half of 2007. We are astonished that PwC appeared not to recognize an amber light that flashed so
brightly. Id. at. 40-41.
98. PRA's APPROACH TO BANKING SUPERVISION 2013, supra note 97, 67.
99. Trotman & Wright, supra note 45, at 51.
100. Prem Sikka, Financial Crisis and the Silence of the Auditors, 34 Accr., ORGs., & Soc'y, 868, 870 (2009).
101. Basel Comm., supra note 18, 46.
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mation, is required to gauge the likely impact of the bank's activities on existing and future
depositor or investors.1 02
The auditors are required in accordance with section 495(4) of the Companies Act 2006
to state whether their audit report is qualified or not.103 Banks are also expected to notify
the FSA of a possible qualification of the annual financial statements, even if this is no
more than a comment on an aspect of its accounts. Consequently, qualification of the
financial accounts of a bank is not a simple decision.'0
A review of the financial accounts of U.K. banks for 2002-2011 found that a number of
financial statements were qualified by their auditors. 05 In this period, 17 out of 5,864
banks in this category had qualified accounts for either one or two of the years. 06 The
majority of these are not prominent institutions, but a few well-known names-such as
Northern Rock Asset Management Plc in 2008 and RBS Financial Products Plc in 2006-
did have their accounts qualifiedo7 But these qualifications did not cause a loss of confi-
dence, possibly because they were not widely publicized or clearly applied to a part of the
banking group that was not so well known. In the case of Northern Rock Asset Manage-
ment, it is perhaps no surprise as it is essentially the "bad" bank separate from the "good"
bank that has recently been sold to Virgin Money.os But for deposit-taking institutions,
the matter of qualification of accounts may need to be considered separately; the
probability of a loss of confidence that could pose a significant risk of a bank run is techni-
cally much higher. The qualification of financial statements would also have an impact on
the bank's credit rating, so its cost of borrowing would also be adversely affected.
102. Id.
103. SUP, supra note 61, 3.2.2G; see Companies Act, c. 3, § 495(4).
104. The auditors of BCCI in the late 1980s and 1990 raised concerns about the bank, but did not go as far
as qualifying the accounts. According to Plaistowe of the ICA, the possibility of causing a run on a bank "is
always a question which you have to have in your mind when you are auditing a bank." However, he then
goes further, saying, "if any auditor were in a position that he had doubts about the accounts of a company
such that he wanted to qualify those accounts then that is, indeed, what he should do." TREASURY AND CIVIL
SERV. Comm., HOUSE OF COMMONS & INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENG. AND WALES, BANK-
ING SUPERVISION AND BCCI: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL REGULATION, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 31,
q. 106 (1992) [hereinafter BANKING SUPERVISION AND BCC1]. But the general consensus in the case of
BCCI is that it was too much to ask the auditors and supervisors to "uncover the deliberate and well-designed
fraud." The Treasury Select Committee relied on Price Waterhouse's argument that "even the best planned
and executed audit will not necessarily discover a sophisticated fraud, especially one where there is collusion
at the highest level of management and with third parties." TREASURY AND CIVIL SERVICE SELECT COM-
MIrrEE, FOURTH REPORT, BANKING SUPERVISION AND BCCI: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL REGULA-
TION, EVIDENCE, 1991-92, H.C. 177, at 59-60 (UK). See Chapter Six: Accountability ofRegulatoiy Decisions,
in BANKING SUPERVISION AND BCCI, supra. This is notwithstanding the subsequent action the audit profes-
sion took against the auditors of BCCI, as highlighted below.
105. Commercial Banks Quahfied Accounts, Thomson ONE, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, http://www.library.
hbs.edu/go/thomsonbanker.html (last accessed Aug. 18, 2011).
106. Id.
107. James Kirkup, Northern Rock to Repay 270m Due to Paperwork Error, THE TELEGRAPH (Dec. 11, 2012,
6:46 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/ 9 738285/Northern-Rock-to-
repay-270m-due-to-paperwork-error.html; Id.
108. Northern Rock Sold to Virgin Money, BBC NEws (Nov. 17, 2011, 9:12 AM), http://www.wsws.org/en/
articles/2003/05/japa-m28.htnl.
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The qualification of financial statements therefore raises serious dilemmas for auditors
balancing past performance with future performance,'-o especially when a problem arises
more than six months after an audit and losses are exposed or, worse, the institution col-
lapses or is subsequently bailed out with taxpayers' money.10
An issue particularly pertinent to the qualification of financial accounts is whether the
bank is a going concern. As highlighted by the House of Lords in 2011, "an auditor might
properly regard a bank as a going concern even when a non-bank in a similar position
might not be so regarded, since a bank that got into difficulties would be bailed out."'II
As the banks were able to access liquidity via the central banks while the markets were
closed, the question of whether they were going concerns is difficult to address. Moreo-
ver, the primary role of the auditor to assess past performance means its ability to assess
future performance is limited or non-existent.112 This, albeit a recent reality, epitomizes
an acute form of moral hazard, which requires not so much more regulation, but a cultural
shift away from the presumption of bail-out and back to the presumption of letting the
market decide whether a bank or non-bank should survive, with the regulator making sure
the resolution of a bank or non-bank in distress is orderly.
At the height of the financial crisis a more cautious approach was arguably necessary
when it was seen that the crisis was threatening the systemically important, financially
sound institutions, as well as the financially unsound." 3 So much so that the financial
accounts of the banks did not mention the dialogue between the regulators and auditors
during these periods of stress." 4 One could argue the disclosure of even that kind of
information could have possibly resulted in a panic and so necessitated avoiding being
disclosed. In those circumstances, concerns about financial stability may rightly need to
outweigh concerns about market integrity when panic on the scale in 2008 saw all ration-
ality in the market disappear.1 5 The auditors, while liaising with the financial regulator,
may have to take into account wider public interest concerns, although they are not actu-
ally mandated to do so.
A view seems to have nevertheless developed, however, that emergency liquidity assis-
tance offered to banks experiencing liquidity problems is of right and not something that
109. ACCA, supra note 96, at 13. The Paper provides: "The auditors' responsibility as regards going con-
cern does not, in fact, require them to give any guarantee that the company will survive for the foreseeable
future."
110. Sikka, supra note 100, at 870-71.
111. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS CoMMITrEEE, AUDrrORS: MARKET CONCENTRATION AND THEIR ROLE, 2010-
12, H.L. 119-1, 1 144 (U.K.).
112. ACCA, supra note 96, at 13. The Paper provides: "Auditors need only assess whether the going con-
cern assumption is appropriate as a basis for preparing the current financial statements. They must consider
whether any events or liabilities (contingent or otherwise) might threaten the company's solvency but the
responsibility does not require them to make any assessment of the company's financial health beyond an
assessment of the company's prospects in so far as they affect the chosen basis of reporting."
113. See ECONOMIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 111, 1 144; cf G. Wood, Towards a Coherent Crisis
Resolution Mandate, in FINANCIAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND BANK RESOLUTION 57 (John Raymond
LaBrosse, Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal & Dalvinder Singh eds., 2009).
114. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, supra note 111, 1 140.
115. See Roger McCormick, United Kingdom, in THE INT'L BAR ASSOCIATION'S TASK FORCE ON THE FIN.
CssIs, A SURVEY OF CURRENT REGULATORY TRENDS 55, 77-78 (2010), available at http://www.se.ac.uk/
collections/law/projects/1fm/FinancialCrisisReport -_-October_2010_-complete[ll.pdf.
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could be rejected.1 6 While the recent crisis certainly seems to imply a culture of rescue
with public funds, the historical record of the Bank has been one of firmly letting banks in
such circumstances sink"l7 or sink in an orderly way, if sinking could be done in an orderly
manner." 8 The Bank's record as Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) would suggest caution
against a presumption that such assistance should be considered "normal practice."" 9
The assistance in the past has traditionally been extremely limited and on the basis of a
penalty rate,120 with a view that some form of mismanagement has likely led the Bank to
need LOLR assistance given the Bank's raison d'etre is its skill of managing the maturity
mismatch of asset and liabilities.121
VI. The Accountability of Auditors
The fallout from corporate failures ultimately focuses attention on apportioning blame
among the various culprits. The auditor, as a gatekeeper, is an obvious target, considering
its responsibility for verifying the stewardship of the company as a going concern. When
issues of fraud come to light the first question is the following: what did the auditors know
and why didn't they raise the alarm earlier? Assessment of enforcement action by the
profession suggests it does not provide sufficient deterrence against poor auditing. This is
exacerbated in some ways by the Companies Act 2006, which enables auditors to limit
their liability.122 Limitation of liability is possible provided it is "fair and reasonable" to
all parties and gets shareholder approval.1 23 Individual companies and auditors can nego-
tiate the extent of any limitation.124 In this respect, the auditor may negotiate for the bank
to hold the auditor proportionately liable when the loss or fraud was primarily caused by
another party. The limitation agreement does not allow the auditor to disregard its pro-
fessional duty of care in completing the audit.125
The U.K. Financial Reporting Council's (FRC) Conduct Committee (CC) set up in
2012 and replaced the FRC's, Accountancy & Actuarial Discipline Board (AADB)126 deals
116. SHARMAN PANEL, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE SHARMAN INQUIRY-GOING CONCERN AND Li-
QUIDITY RISKS: LESSONS FOR COMPANIES AND AUDITORS-FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE PANEL OF INQUIRY 54 (2012), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/59la5e2a-35d7-4470-
a46c-30cOd8ca2al4/Sharman-Inquiry-Final-Report.aspx [hereinafter THE SHARMAN INQUIRY].
117. Id.
118. Rosa Lastra & Geoffrey Wood, Bank Insolvency in the Context ofCrisis Management, in CROSS-BORDER
BANK INSOLVENCY 1 (Lee Bucheit & Rosa Lastra ed., 2011).
119. See THE SHARMAN INQUIRY, supra note 116.
120. Lastra & Wood, supra note 118. In this paper, mention is made of applying a different rate, not neces-
sarily a penalty rate of interest, at 13. This was not the policy adopted with the Dunfermline Building Soci-
ety. See Dalvinder Singh, The UK Banking Act 2009, Pre-Insolvency and Early Intervention: Policy and Practice, I
J.B.L 20, 35 (2011).
121. See Patricia Jackson, Deposit Protection and Bank Failures in the United Kingdom, 1 FIN. STABILITY REV.
38, 43 (1996).
122. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, GUIDANCE ON AUDITOR LIABILrTY LIMITATION AGREEMENTS 33 (June





126. The Conduct Committee of the Financial Reporting Council replaced the Accountancy and Actuarial
Discipline Board in October 2012. Professional Discipline, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, https://www.frc.
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with "cases which raise... important issues affecting the public interest."127 The number
of cases investigated by the CC, and formerly by the AADB, suggests it has an insufficient
deterrent effect on the behavior of accountants. For example, data from the CC's own
website, which includes those cases being investigated by the AADB indicate it is presently
investigating nineteen cases which date back to 2005.128 Of those, the CC, formerly the
AADB, is currently investigating three cases that relate to the financial crisiS. 129 One is
the 2007 audit of Lehman Brothers prepared by Ernst & Young LLP and Ernst & Young
LLP's inadequate reporting of Lehman Brothers' inadequate separation of client assets
prepared for the former FSA.13 0 Another case, also having to do with compliance with the
former FSA client asset reports, was an audit by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP for J.P.
Morgan Securities Ltd.13I One could argue there is little enforcement activity, albeit
these are some of the most prominent cases, so their number could arguably be limited,
and the bulk of the disciplinary cases are handled by the professional bodies themselves,
skewing the overall number of enforcement actions.
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW) is responsible
for maintaining professional standards of its members.132 A review of the enforcement
activity shows some interesting findings. First, the fines for what are considered to be
serious reprimands are relatively small, at about Y2,000-6,000.133 Secondly, the enforce-
ment activities in 2010-2011 centered around the regulatory decisions of relatively
smaller firms; no individual at the Big Four was reprimanded, and further data gathered
from other years leads to the same conclusion. 134 It is argued that the sanctions lack the
appropriate deterrence effect and the level of transparency of those decisions is questiona-
ble as well.135
The problems of poor auditing and the limited fines the professional bodies administer
are further illustrated by looking at the most prominent bank failures before the 2007
financial crisis, and indeed the recent J.P. Morgan Securities tribunal decision.136
org.uk/Our-Work/Conduct/Professional-discipline.aspx (last visited Aug. 22, 2013); Accountancy and Actuarial
Discipline Board, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org.uk/About-the-FRC/FRC-structure/Former-
FRC-structure/Accountancy-and-Actuarial-Discipline-Board.aspx (last visited Aug. 22, 2013).
127. Id.
128. Present Cases, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Conduct/Professional-
discipline/Present-cases.aspx (last visited Aug. 22, 2013).
129. Id.
130. See AADB Investigating Events at Lehman Brothers, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL (une 16, 2010), www.
frc.org.uk/News-and-Events/FRC-Press/Press/2010/June/AADB-investigating-events-at-Lehman-
Brothers.aspx.
131. Final Notice from Fin. Services Auth. toJ.P. Morgan Securities Ltd (May 25, 2010), available at http://
www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/final/jpmsl.pdf [hereinafter Final Notice to J.P. Morgan].
132. See THE INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENG. & WALES, www.icaew.com (last visited Aug.
13, 2013).
133. See THE INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENG. & WALES, GUIDANCE ON SENTENCING 22
(2013), available at http://www.icaew.com/-/media/Files/About-ICAEW/What-we-do/protecting-the-pub
lic/complaints-process/guidance-on-sentencing.pdf.
134. Compilation of ICAEW cases showing no Big Four firms are involved is on file with author.
135. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO CONSULTATION PAPER ON SANCTIONS
GUIDANCE TO TRIBUNALs, 1-2 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Pro
fessional-Discipline/Analysis-of-responses-to-consultation-paper-on-San.aspx.
136. Final Notice to J.P. Morgan, supra note 131.
SUMMER 2013
86 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
VII. BCCI, Barings Bank, and J.P. Morgan Securities Case Studies
When BCCI was closed, many questioned the work of the auditors involved with
BCCI.137 This case became one of the most controversial cases both in the United King-
dom and around the world.138 Numerous senior directors were prosecuted for fraud, and
the losses totaled £9 billion.139 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), the external auditor, was
fined a total of £975,000 by the JDS Tribunal for failing to give a true and fair view of
BCCI's management and financial affairs, which constitutes conduct that falls short of
what an external auditor is reasonably expected to do.40 Although these charges related
to the 1987 and 1988 audits, the JDS Tribunal decision fined PwC in 2006 for failing to
prepare the 1987 and 1988 audits in accordance with International Accounting Standards
(IAS).141 One of these violations was that PwC did not comply with IAS 24 in its 1987,
1988, and 1989 audits because it failed to disclose the link between BCCI and the ICIC
Group as a "related part relationship" and the share ownership between the two, which
provided security for the lending to ICIC by BCCI.142 PwC also failed to disclose
whether the loan loss provision for the 1987 accounts reflected the level of lending and
bad debt provision for the year for major clients, such as CAH and Gulf Group.143 The
JDS Tribunal found that PwC did not obtain sufficient audit evidence to "enable it to
draw reasonable conclusions therefrom," which it could only have done if it "obtained
additional appropriate evidence about the value of the security and its enforceability" and
"the adequacy of claim loss provisions against the Gulf Group related lending."'- The
important question of whether auditors should take all the blame was discussed above. 8 5
Barings collapsed as a result of Nick Leeson's trading activities in Singapore, which led
to massive losses totaling £827 million and caused the parent company, Barings Bros &
Co, to be placed in the hands of administrators.46 Complaints against Coopers &
Lybrand's (C&L) audit engagement partner, Andrew Charles Turner, were dismissed,
however, 47 and the fine for C&L was £250,000.148 A fine for Gareth Maldwyn Davies, a
137. Complaints Against the United Kingdom Firm of Price Waterhouse, Before Adrian Brunner QC, Chairman,
JoINT DISCIPLINARY SCHEME TRIBUNAL, THE INST. OF CHARTERED AccouNTANTs IN ENG. AND WALES
Gan. 25, 2006) [hereinafter Complaints against PwCJ; SINGH, supra note 19, at 162.
138. Complaints against PwC, supra note 137; SINGH, supra note 19, at 162.
139. Complaints against PwC, supra note 137; SINGH, supra note 19, at 162.
140. Complaints against PwC, supra note 137; SINGH, supra note 19, at 162.
141. Complaints against PwC, supra note 137; SINGH, supra note 19, at 162
142. Complaints against PwC, supra note 137; SINGH, supra note 19, at 162.
143. Complaints against PwC, supra note 137; SINGH, supra note 19, at 162.
144. Complaints against PwC, s-upra note 137, at 42, 52. SINGH, supra note 19, at 162-163.
145. Supra § VI.
146. BD. OF BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK OF ENG., REPORT OF THE BOARD OF BANKING SUPERVISION
INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE COLLAPSE OF BARINGS, (July 1995); MICHAEL CHOO SAN
Lim & NICKY NG KUANG TAN, BARINGS FUTURES (SINGAPORE) PTE LTD: INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 231 OF THE COMPANIES ACT (CHAPTER 50); THE REPORT OF THE INSPECTORS APPOINTED BY
THE MINISTER FOR FINANCE (Sept. 6, 1995); Andersen, supra note 54; Re Barings plc (No. 5), Secretary for
Trade and Industry v. Baker and Others (No. 5), [1999] 1 B.C.L.C. 433, ch. D.
147. Report: Coopers r Lybrand, Gareth Maldwyn Davies and Andrew Charles Turner, JOINT DISCIPLINARY
SCHEME TRIBUNAL, THE INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENG. AND WALES (Apr. 29, 2002);
Michelle Perry, Coopers Fined in Barings Disciplinary, AccoUNrANCYAGE (Apr. 29, 2002), available at http://
www.accountancyage.com/aa/news/1774559/coopers-fined-barings-disciplinary.
148. Perry, supra note 147.
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C&L partner, was S25,000.149 "The complaints before the JDS Tribunal identified] a
number of failures at Barings that could have been discovered if the approach to the audit
had been effectively evaluated to ensure the integrity of the work." 50 The case funda-
mentally called into question the reliance placed on the internal controls at Barings and a
lack of observance of audit guidelines to determine whether the accounts gave a "true and
fair view."s'5 For example, the discrepancy in the margin payments to Leeson could have
been uncovered if C&L had independently verified the data with the Singapore Interna-
tional Monetary Exchange, as it should have done, rather than relying on information
provided by Barings.
The recent case of PwC, and its inaccurate reporting of J.P. Morgan Securities Limited
Client Money's segregation of client funds between 2002 and 2009, resulted in the former
AADB issuing a fine of £1.4 million in December 2011.152 The issue of segregation of
client assets is an elementary part of managing a client's business activities.15 3 J.P. Mor-
gan was fined a record £33 million for its failures to segregate client assets.154 The
problems J.P. Morgan Securities experienced were a result of the earlier merger between
J.P. Morgan & Co. and the Chase Manhattan Corporation to form J.P. Morgan Chase &
Co. in and around 2000.'ss This caused a lack of harmonization of computer systems,
which meant the client money in the futures and options division of the business was
placed by the treasury overnight into a desegregated account. 5 6 J.P. Morgan Securities
reported the error to its accountants at PwC and the FSA. 57 The failure exposed the
inadequacy of PwC's past reporting of J.P. Morgan's compliance with the FSA's rules on
client money.
The AADB found PwC to have fallen short of the professional standards expected of a
member firm, and decided to reprimand it severely.158 In arriving at its decision, the
AADB found it immensely difficult to decide on the size of the fine due to the current
professional guidelines on financial penalties.1 59 The largest fine ever imposed was in the
149. Id.
150. SINGH, supra note 19, at 162.
151. Id. at 156.
152. Accountancy & Actuarial Discipline Board v. Pricewaterhousecoopers LLP, Fin. Reporting Council, at
15 (Dec. 6, 2011), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/FRC-Documents/AADB/Decision.aspx [hereinafter
AADB v. PwC].
153. This issue rose in prominence with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and difficulties the
administrators experienced getting clients their money back. Alistair Osborne & Helia Ebrahimi, Auditors
Face Probe Over Client Assets, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 5, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/news
bysector/banksandfinance/8042 3 54/Auditors-face-probe-over-client-assets.html.
154. Kirsten Ridley, UK Fines]JPMorgan Record $49 Million, REUTERS (un. 3, 2010, 1:29 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2010/06/03/us-britain-fine-jpmorgan-idUSTRE652 1J520100603.
155. See Michael J. Kristan & Megan R. Slonski, DML to SIX Integration at JPMorgan Chase, WORCESTER
POLYTECHNIC INST. 5 (2006), http://www.wpi.edu/Pubs/E-project/Available/E-project-121406-142056/un
restricted/MQPReport.pdf.
156. AADB v. PwC, supra note 152 at 1-2.
157. See id. at 2.
158. Outcome of Disciplinary Hearing: PricewaterhoueCoopers LLP, ICAEWMember Firm in Connection with JP
Morgan Securities Limited, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.frc.org.uk/News-and-
Events/FRC-Press/Press/2012/January/Outcome-of-Disciplinary-Hearing-PricewaterhouseCoo.aspx. .
159. See ACCOUNTANCY AND ACTUARIAL DisCIPLINE BD., FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, SANCTIONs GUI-
DANCE TO TRIBUNALS: A CONSULTATION PAPER 12 (Apr. 2012), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/getatt
achment/2a281336-fl3f-4815-bO6a-e8aflfd51402/Sanctions-Guidance-to-Tribunals-a-consultation-(1).aspx.
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Robert Maxwell affair, where the JDS, the predecessor to the AADB and now the CC,
imposed a fine of 21.2 million.o60 The general conclusions of the decision highlight the
inadequacy of the current guidelines inter alia to protect the public interest and maintain
the standards expected in the profession through the imposition of a penalty appropriate
to the severity of the matter and so to deter others in the future. It is implicit in the
decision that the level of fines had not risen in light of the size of the audit fees now
commanded and the profits generated by the member firms.
It concluded that decisions such as these needed to take into account a number of fac-
tors, and required an increase in the level of fine to 22 million to ensure:
"1) Protection of the public from risk;
2) The marking of sufficient disapproval of the conduct in question;
3) Deterrence of future misconduct by Member Firms or individuals (whether the
respondent to the instant case or others);
4) The size and scope of the business of the Member Firms conducting audits of and
reporting on global financial services firms."161
This preliminary review of the kind of enforcement action taken by the profession
against its members does provide evidence of a lack of deterrence. Whether one looks at
the prominent cases or cases against individuals by the professional association, the level
of accountability and the level of penalties seem to offer a limited level of deterrence. And
the move to limiting liability via contractual means adds up to a lack of overall deterrence
when the level of actions seems to be one of the reasons for the limits.162 The limited
level of professional accountability is not fully countered by the reputational risk auditors
are exposed to, such as the catastrophic experience of Arthur Andersen post-Enron. 63
Moreover, the FSA's power to disqualify auditors for poor reporting follows a similar line
because, rather than the FSA undertaking a disqualification action, it relies on the profes-
sional bodies to investigate and decide on these cases, side stepping the matter and making
the power benign. 64 As these are essentially extremely rare events, to rely on this as a
deterrence distorts the kinds of issues that could go on under the radar that require a more
coherent and effective enforcement strategy that addresses the various forms of non-com-
pliance and breach of professional standards that may occur.
The recent review of bank audits commissioned by the FSA under its new special ar-
rangements with the FRC highlights a number of areas of concern. 65 These were promi-
nent during the recent crisis and considered by the former AIU, which was replaced with
the Audit Quality Review (AQR), to be significant.166 A theme that is highlighted
throughout this paper is the lack of overall scrutiny of audit evidence and its independent
verification, and more specifically the testing of techniques adopted by management in
completing the accounts. The level of scrutiny of management representations was simply
160. AADB v. PwC, supra note 152, at 13.
161. Id.
162. P.E. Morris, Contractual Limitations on the Auditor's Liability: An Uneasy Combination of Law and Account-
ing, 72 M.L.R. 607, 607 (2009).
163. Flynn McRoberts, The Fall of Andersen, Cn. TRIB. (Sept. 1, 2002), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/chi-0209010315sep0l,0,53875 1.story.
164. ENHANCING THE Auorroo's CoNTRIBUTION TO PRUDENTIAL REGULATION, supra note 81, at 38.
165. See id. at 12.
166. AUDIY INSPECTION UNIT, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT 2010/11 13 (uly 19, 2011),
available at http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/AIU/AIU-2010-11-Annual-Report.aspx.
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not robust enough, thus calling into question the level of skepticism shown by auditors. A
principal reason for this is the pressure to complete the audit within the designated period
of time so that it does not exceed the allocated budget.
The recent PwC case confirms that the sanctioning policy of the profession is less than
what regulators are expected to have in place. The guidance, by the profession, for the
tribunal to apply was considered wanting.167 The former AADB decision made reference
to the Macrory Report on regulatory sanctions and highlighted what the key principles
should be in deciding a penalty: to "change the behaviour of the offenders," eliminate any
financial gain or benefit, make sanctions proportionate, justify their choice of enforcement
actions year on year, enforce in a transparent manner, among others.168 In view of the size
of the Big Four accountancy firms and the considerable profits they generate, the size of
the proposed new minima is not quite what one would consider proportionate to the
profits they generate from an individual audit client.
A. THE POWERS OF THE FCA AND PRA
The regulators, particularly the former FSA, clearly set out that they sought to rely on
the professional standards of the auditing profession and what it considered reasonable,
rather than the FSA trying to duplicate and hold auditors separately accountable.169 This
is notwithstanding the fact that the previous regime, like the new regime, confers on the
regulators powers to take disciplinary actions against external auditors.170
The FCA has the authority to take disciplinary action against an external auditor, and
the PRA is in the curious position of the U.K Treasury, deciding whether or not it should
have disciplinary powers against auditors.171 This is possibly because the PRA is responsi-
ble for the larger systemically important banks, so any decision to take action against an
external auditor of such a firm could have wider market repercussions. The powers of the
FCA and the PRA are, in substance and detail, the same, albeit in the latter case, the HM
Treasury will need to confer those powers on the PRA.17 2 The FCA and the PRA have
the authority to take disciplinary action if an external auditor has failed in his duty or
failed to communicate information to them. 73 The FCA and the PRA could decide to
either disqualify them from acting as auditors, publish a statement to the effect that the
regulator is of the view the auditor has failed to comply with his duty, or impose a pen-
alty.174 The power of the FCA and the PRA to disqualify an auditor can be removed if
they are of the view that the auditor has been rehabilitated and will comply with his duty
in the future.175
167. See id. at 9.
168. Richard Macrory, Reforming Regulatory Sanctions-Designing A Systematic Approach, in THE REGULATORY
STATE: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONs 229, 231 (Dawn Oliver et al. eds., 2010).
169. See Dalvinder Singh, The Role of Third Parties in Banking Regulation and Supervision, J. OF INT'L BANK-
ING REGULATION, 4, 275 (2003).
170. See Financial Services Act, c. 21, § 345(1), sch. 12, § 345A(2).
171. Id. §§ 345, 345A.
172. Id.
173. Id. §§ 345(1), 345A(2).
174. Id. §§ 345(2), 345A(4).
175. See Financial Services and Markets Act, c. 8, §§ 354(7), 345A(7); see also Financial Services Act,
§§ 345(6), 345A(7).
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The power to take enforcement action against the external auditor is certainly necessary
in order to manage the relationship between the bank and the external auditor and the
requirements the FCA and the PRA expect the external auditor to adhere to. The likeli-
hood of the FCA and the PRA actually taking action against the external auditor is, how-
ever, remote if past experience with the FSA's approach is anything to go by.'7 6 The FSA
was of the view that it would rely on the professional bodies to decide whether or not
enforcement action, as highlighted above, is appropriate.17' As has been shown above,
there is considerable doubt cast over whether the profession will adopt a more intensive
enforcement approach in order to ensure external auditors do what the regulators expect
of them. The sanctions model of the auditing profession does not even remotely reflect
the one that exists to ensure the financial services industry is kept in line. It is difficult to
see any change in this regard unless the PRA and the FCA put pressure on the profession
to get its enforcement approach in line so that the enforcement approach reflects the more
intensive approach now expected.178
The following section looks at the international experience and suggests what proce-
dures other jurisdiction have put in place to address some of the coordination problems
highlighted above. These could be reviewed in light of the discretion the new regulatory
structure confers on the new regulators.
VIII. Further Reflections on the Use of External Auditors as Supervisory
Gatekeepers: With Some Reference to the International Experience of
Using External Auditors
The use of external auditors is wide and varied, and a review of some of the issues
highlighted by the IMF and World Bank through the Financial Sector Assessment Pro-
gramme is a useful basis to assess some of the concerns that have arisen.179 International
experience suggests that where there is a lack of regulatory resources, the use of external
auditors is an option that can bridge that resource gap. But the experience also shows that
effective regulation of the relationship between the regulator and auditor is crucial to
overall success. Effective oversight needs to address the possibility of over- or under-
accommodation in supervision.
176. See PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AuTH. & FIN. SERVS. ATTH., BANK OF ENG., THE PRA's APPROACH
To BANIGo SUPERVISION 35 (Oct. 2012), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Docu
ments/other/pra/bankingapprl2 10.pdf [hereinafter PRA's APPROACH TO BANKING SUPERVISION 2012].
177. See Financial Services Act §§ 345(1), 345A(2).
178. See PRA's APPROACH TO BANKING SUPERVISION 2012, supra note 176, at 14-15.
179. The use of FSAP reports to delineate international experience of regulation is often referred to in
official publications. See generally DOUGLAS W. ARNER, FINANCIAL STABILITY, EcONONic GROWTH, AND
THE ROLE OF LAW (2007); Dalvinder Singh, The Role of the IMFand World Bank in Financial Sector Reform and
Compliance, in REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL EcoNomic LAW 331 (Wenhua Shan, Pene-
lope Simons & Dalvinder Singh eds., 2008); IAN P. DEwING & PETER 0. RUSSELL, THE CONTRASTING
ROLE OF AUDITORS IN UK AND Swiss BANKING SUPERVISION 25-26 (2010), available at www.icas.org.uk/
site/cms/download/res/DewingRussellReport_Dec_2010.pdf (following this specifically in the auditing
context) [hereinafter DEWING & RUSSELL, CONTRASTING ROLE]; Ian P. Dewing & Peter 0. Russell, Audi-
tors as Regulatory Actors: The Role ofAuditors in Banking Regulation in Switzerland, 21 EUR. Accr. REv., 1, 1-28
(2012) (exploring the issues by comparing the UK and Swiss models). The research for this paper takes a
much broader look at the issues highlighted in other countries that use external auditors in banking supervi-
sion, so a wider picture can be gained of their use and indeed the limitations associated with poor oversight.
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A key issue with the relationship between external auditor and regulator is the extent to
which the regulator has relied on the audit findings. The United States experience high-
lights the importance of having a coherent approach to taking action against auditors. 80
The level of reliance on the external auditor needs to be assessed by looking at what the
regulator and the auditor are expected to do.181 The level of oversight of external auditors
needs to be sufficient to protect the public objective of the regulator with better profes-
sional oversight.182 Alternatively, the regulator needs to be confident that the auditing
profession can meet its expectations in terms of professional enforcement action against its
own members. A general conclusion is the importance of supervision bridging the knowl-
edge, insight, and responsibility gap between regulators and auditors about individual
banks.
Conflicts of interest between the external auditor and the client bank need to be identi-
fied, and the risk of them materializing or undermining the objectives of the regulator
needs to be monitored. 83 This ensures that the impartiality of the auditor's decision-
making is monitored by the regulator. 84 For example, in Switzerland the bank audit firm
has to disclose the extent of the non-audit work provided to the client, and additional
special audits are commissioned.18 5 The risks associated with using external auditors have
been the focus of additional efforts by the Swiss regulators to police the work of external
auditors, including better coordination with the auditor's cross-border and foreign
regulators.' 86
180. The relatively recent (2004) decision by the OCC to take action again Grant Thornton regarding its
audit of First National Bank of Keystone was taken after it transpired the insolvency of Keystone Bank was
not discovered. The OCC took action on the grounds that the audit firm had recklessly engaged in an unsafe
and unsound banking practice by failing to audit the accounts of the bank properly and failing to bring to its
attention the non-existent $98 million of income and $450 million of assets. The FDIC's role is a lot broader
in its role of official receiver in terms of claims and recoveries once a bank is liquidated, as was the case
against Grant Thornton regarding its audits of Keystone Bank, explored earlier. The OCC also fined Grant
Thornton $300,000. Grant Thornton, LLP, Nos. AA-EC-04-02, AA-EC-04-03 (OCC, Comptroller of the
Currency, Dec. 7, 2006) (final decision and order). The action was successfully challenged on technical
grounds. See Grant Thornton, LLP v. F.D.I.C., 535 F. Supp. 2d 676 (S.D.W. Va. 2007) rev'd sub nom. Ellis v.
Grant Thornton LLP, 530 F.3d 280 (4th Cir. 2008).
181. In the Swiss model, external auditors carry out the most significant part ofon-site bank supervision; this
is known as a "dualist system." Int'l Monetary Fund, Switzerland. Financial System Stability Assessment, Includ-
ing Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes on the Following Topia: Banking Supervision, Securities Regula-
tion, Insurance Regulation, Payment Systems, and Monetary and Financial Policy Transparency, 16-17, Country
Report No. 02/108 fune 2002), available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2002/crO2108.pdf [hereinafter
IMF 02/108]. See generally Eva Hiipkes, Mark Quintyn & Michael W. Taylor, Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF
Working Paper: The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Principles and Practice 28, WP/05/51 (Mar.
2005), available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp0551.pdf.
182. In many respects, the Swiss trade-off between more supervisory staff or more use of external auditors
resulted in the increase use of external auditors.
183. The IMF report on Austria even goes as far as to suggest the rotation of external auditors, which goes
beyond the remit of most corporate governance expectations. See Int'l Monetary Fund, Austria: Financial
Sector Assessment Prsgram Update Technical Note-Factual Update and Analysis of the Basel Core Principles for
Effective Banking Supervision, 13, Country Report No. 08/205 Jul. 2008).
184. IMF 02/108, supra note 181.
185. See generally Eva Hiipkes, The Erternal Auditor and the Bank Supervisor: 'Sherlock Holmes and Doctor
Watson?', 7 J. BANKING REG. 145 (2006).
186. Int'l Monetary Fund, Switzerland: Financial Sector Assessment Program-Factual Update-Basel Core Prin-
ciplesfor Effective Banking Supervision, 5, Country Report No. 07/198 June 2007), available at http://www.imf
org/extemal/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07198.pdf.
SUMMER 2013
92 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
The regulator needs to ensure that the use of external auditors in banking supervision is
designed so the gaps between on-site and off-site inspections and reports do not leave
loopholes that could result in missed opportunities to deal with red flags because either
the regulator or the auditor thought the other was responsible for handling the matter.187
The risk of auditors forbearing from acting on "audit evidence" that questions the viability
of a bank is equally an issue as it is with regulators forbearing from taking decisions when
regulatory evidence suggests the bank is not viable. Therefore, as we have recently exper-
ienced, a move to minimizing regulatory forbearing external auditors would logically be
required to implement similar measures if the external auditor is going to be heavily relied
upon with early intervention powers.188
The relationship between the regulator and the auditor needs to be set in the context of
some form of coherent framework rather than left in an informal, piecemeal fashion. The
risk of regulator and auditor forbearance is credible and requires a robust structure to
curtail it.189 The focus of attention is the wider public objectives set by the regulator; one
cannot simply assume that the expectations of the auditors' mandate to the company and
the "enlightened shareholder" will suffice to meet and protect those public objectives.190
This is based on the argument that the regulator and auditor do not sing from the same
"hymn sheet" and an expectations gap is inevitable.191 The recent review by the Swiss
Financial Market Supervisory Authority (SFMSA) of using external auditors has suggested
it intends to go further to overcome the expectations gap.192 Even with the SFMSA's
more robust oversight of external auditors, it has concluded that the perception firms have
is still that the auditor is the auditor of financial statements in accordance with the
adopted accounting standards and the financial regulator is the financial regulator to pro-
tect the perimeter of the authorized activities, regardless of the fact that the auditor is
187. A conclusion in the FSAP report for Germany highlighted the fact that reliance on external auditors
without effective oversight of the use of them creates gaps and time lags to act promptly if the external
auditor is not overseen by the regulator properly. The report also implies that without additional require-
ments on the external auditor, gaps in the reporting requirements could be missed. This gap exists because
the supervisor has not put in place sufficient mechanisms to monitor reporting requirements. Int'l Monetary
Fund, Germany: Financial System Stability Assessment, Including Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes
on the Following Topics: Banking Supervision, Securities Regulation, Insurance Regulation, Monetary and Financial
Policy Transparency, Payment Systems, and Securities Settlement, Country Report No. 03/343 (Nov. 2003). The
reports expected from the auditor require further guidance from the regulator to identify issues that are
pertinent to its concerns about the banks. See Int'l Monetary Fund, Austria: Financial System Stability Assess-
ment-Update, Country Report No. 08/190 (une 2008) [hereinafter IMF 08/190].
188. An example is where the speed of decision making of the external auditor poses risks to the Austrian
financial system as it means the regulator cannot take action as promptly as it might like to. IMF 08/190,
supra note 187, at 15.
189. See generally G.G.H Garcia, Failing Prompt Corrective Action, 11 J. BANKING REG. 171 (2010); see also
Sikka, supra note 100, at 868.
190. Sikka, et. al., supra note 53; Puxty, Sikka & Willmott, supra note 53, at 339; Humphrey, Moizer &
Turley,supra note 53, at 153. The U.S. Cohen Commission in 1978 first brought to the public platform the
idea of an "expectations gap." THE COMM'N ON AUDrroIRs' RESPONSIBILmIEs, AM. INsT. OF CERTIFIED
AccOUNrAN-s, REPORT, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS xi-xii (1978), available at http*//
3197d6dl4b5fl9f2f440-5e1 3d29c4cOl6cf96cbbfdl97c579b45.r81.cfl.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1970/
1978_0101_CohenAuditors.pdf.
191. Humphrey, Moizer & Turley, supra note 53, at 155-157.
192. See Fin. Stability Board, Peer Review of Switzerand: Review Report, 24 (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://
www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_-250112.pdf.
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undertaking work essentially of a financial regulator as a supervisory gatekeeper. 93 It is
therefore moving towards separating the dual role of the external auditor into the financial
audit and the regulatory audit and setting out distinct requirements for the latter.
The idea of auditing the auditor is useful to check the quality of the auditor's work.
The former FSA was of the view that it lacked the technical expertise to undertake such a
task, so the role of the AQR, formerly the AIU, was considered helpful.194 Currently, it is
considered to be the responsibility of the profession itself through the work of the
AQR.195 A recommendation has been made for the financial regulator to work with the
AQR, formerly the AIU, to devise a quality review mechanism for auditors of financial
services firms.196 This is certainly necessary; in its 2010-2011 report, even the AIU found
it difficult to review audits due to their complexity.197 The report suggests very few files
are actually reviewed. For example, for the Big Four firms, only sixty-eight files were
reviewed in 2009-10 and fifty-four in 2008, which do not look like sufficient numbers to
generate a level of confidence about audit quality.198 Of these files, 15 percent were from
the banking, finance, and insurance sector, so the confidence and assurance of audit qual-
ity provided by the former AIU are limited.199 The 2010-2011 AIU annual report indi-
cates how the banking sector was one of the specific areas it reviewed in light of the
financial crisis and the overall concerns about audit confidence. 200 To make this effective
and useful for the regulator, it might be an idea to have mandatory reviews of systemically
important financial institutions and possibly expand this practice to other important finan-
cial services firms. This is due to the small number of reviews presently undertaken and
the systemic problems posed by banks and non-banks. It is important to highlight that
recent experience indicates both banks and non-bank financial services firms can pose a
systemic threat to the financial system.
While the United Kingdom is not moving towards a dualist approach of relying com-
pletely on the external auditor to undertake supervisory examinations like the Swiss sys-
tem, the gaps in terms of responsibilities and expectations need to be bridged formally.201
The move to reinvigorate the meetings between the supervisor and the auditor will not go
far enough, and a number of other steps have to be taken. It has been argued the FSA did
not replace the use of auditors with additional resources. 202 The resourcing of financial
regulators has been a persistent problem: looking back at some of the post-mortems for
banking failures, a key recommendation has generally been to improve staff levels. In the
Swiss system, we have seen a concerted effort to bridge that problem with the use of
auditors, but the recent financial crisis has required it to go further.203
193. See id. at 23.
194. Audit Quality Review, FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Conduct/Audit-
Quality-Review.aspx (last visited Aug. 14, 2013).
195. ENHANCING THE AUDITOR'S CONTRIBUTION TO PRUDENTIAL REGULATION, supra note 81, at 37.
196. See id. at 39.
197. For an exploration of the complexity of accounting, see Christian Laux, The Crisis ofFair-Value Account-
ing: Making Sense of the Recent Debate, 34 AccT., ORGS. & Soc'y 826 (2009).
198. AUDIT ]NSPECTION UNIT, supra note 166, at 13.
199. Id. at 14.
200. Id. at 22.
201. DEWING & RUSSELL, CONTRASTING ROLE, supra note 179, at 37-38.
202. Id. at x.
203. Fin. Stability Board, supra note 192, at 24.
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The U.K. PRA and FCA need to take a similar decision over the extent to which they
will rely on external auditors in the supervision of banks. In the recent MoU between the
PRA and FCA, no mention is made of how they propose to coordinate their responsibili-
ties and oversight of the external auditors in supervision. 204 This is necessary if reliance is
going to be placed on them to undertake supervisory tasks. Moreover, it would be likely
that the PRA and the FCA will receive audit reports for the separately regulated entities,
but it is not quite clear who will receive the audit reports for those dual regulated firms
where the PRA and the FCA take part responsibility for prudential supervision and con-
duct of business.
The regulator needs to be seen to be monitoring the relationship of auditor and client.
The regulator does have the right to disqualify auditors and take action, but relying on the
audit profession to decide and administer any sanctions is called into doubt, as explained
above. This is primarily a matter of political willingness to take direct action, as seen in
the United States, albeit it failed on technical grounds. If the regulator is placing a signifi-
cant amount of reliance on the auditor's work, then there should be sufficient grounds to
take action if the findings of the auditor prevent the regulator from doing its job. Fur-
thermore, as explained above (with reference to the Tribunal decision in JP Morgan Se-
curities) if the enforcement approach of the accounting profession is not in line with the
enforcement approach of the financial regulator, this could exacerbate the expectations
gap.205 If the financial regulator is to protect its reputational capital, then it needs to set
the tone for enforcement-in terms of both intensity and sanctions. The MoU between
the former FSA and the FRC in relation to the work of the former AIU, now the AQR,
does iterate the powers to be able to take action.206 It seems as though the provision is a
veiled threat to the profession that if it does not take appropriate steps, then the PRA or
FCA will initiate its own proceedings.
Another option could be to extend regulatory immunity against actions in negligence
covering the regulator to external auditors, as in the Australian framework, which includes
third parties. The rationale of extending protection is to allow auditors and/or skilled
persons during ad hoc reports-a free rein to report and tackle matters of a regulatory
concern and bring them into the regulatory framework as formally as possible. This could
create the incentives to report supervisory matters more freely by dismantling the link
between the auditor and the firm and re-aligning it with the regulators remit of responsi-
bility so that it eliminates the possibility of the auditor taking a defensive position to guard
the interests of the client. On the other side of the coin, and as this paper emphasizes,
providing immunity to an already relatively immune external auditing profession will sim-
ply exacerbate the already limited environment of accountability.
The onus on the U.K. regulator to decide whether a bank is "failing or is likely to fail,"
to satisfy the threshold conditions for the purpose of deciding on initiation of the special
resolution regime, will certainly put an indirect responsibility on the auditor to judge
whether or not the bank is or was a going concern at the time of the audit. There are
204. Draft Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and
the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), Bank of Eng., available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
financialstability/Documents/overseeing-fs/fca-pradraft mou.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2013) [hereinafter
Draft MoU].
205. See Humphrey, Moizer & Turley, supra note 53, at 158.
206. Draft MoU, supra note 204.
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limits here; as shown above, the audit is not a continuous relationship of monitoring akin
to a supervisor, but more a snapshot of the bank's past performance over a specific period
of time. Moreover, the going-concern requirement does not equate to the expectations of
the supervisor, for whom existing and future consumer interests are the primary concern.
The move towards the requirement in Australia might be worth considering, where audi-
tors are formally required to report if the "auditor has reasonable grounds for believing
that the bank is insolvent, or is at risk of becoming insolvent." 207 In the U.K. context, if
this were in place, then it might have perhaps meant the U.K. authorities would have had
to act earlier rather than latcr in 2008 with its emergency measures to rescue the banks in
light of the clean audit reports they had received early on in the year. An explicit respon-
sibility relating to insolvency matters such as this would certainly tie in better with the
supervisor's responsibility on such matters. Ultimately, the ability to deal with distressed
banks and minimize the potential fallout from a failure needs to be coordinated at all
levels, in a timely manner.
This is further exacerbated if the issue of qualification of financial accounts is put into
the equation as well and is left solely within the discretion of the external auditors and not
sufficiently linked to the role of the regulator and the central bank as the lender of last
resort, notwithstanding the requirement to report. As the decision to qualify the accounts
of Resona Bank clearly highlights, it led to the need for emergency liquidity assistance by
the authorities in Japan due to the potential risk of Resona Bank collapsing due to the
disclosure of its insolvency and causing the risk of contagion in the Japanese banking
system. 208
207. Int'l Monetary Fund, Australia: Financial Assessment Program-Detailed Assessment of Observance of Stan-
dards and Codes, 35, Country Report No. 06/415 (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/
ft/scr/2006/cr06415.pdf.
208. The case of Resona in Japan provides an interesting case study of the risks associated with qualification
of financial statements of a bank. In more recent times, the authorities in Japan experienced the possible
fallout of a bank failure after the auditor threatened to qualify the bank's accounts. The auditors decided to
qualify the accounts of Resona Group, one of its largest banks, after they revealed its poor capital levels and
the inability of the bank to rectify this before the accounts were signed off. The announcement led other
banks to fear that their accounts could also be qualified, causing a systemic panic that prompted the authori-
ties to intervene. The government recapitalized Resona Group to the sum ofVL.96 trillion to avert a systemic
crisis. The auditors were alleged to have been signing off Resona Group's accounts for a number of years
when it was effectively insolvent. This policy was reversed in 2003 after new guidelines were introduced that
stopped banks continuing to use deferred assets to inflate their capital levels. The regulatory authorities
lacked the formal channels of communication with bank auditors, thus the auditors had been acting alone in
such matters. News Release, Resona Holdings Inc., Receipt of Subscription Payments for New Common and
Preferred Shares (Capital Increase with Public Funds) (June 30, 2003), available at www.resona-gr.co.jp/hold
ings/english/news/newsrelease/pdf/030630_1a.pdf; see News Release, Resona Holdings, Inc., Announcement
Regarding Change in Principal Shareholder of Resona Holdings, Inc. (Aug. 7, 2003) available at www.resona-
gr.co.jp/holdings/english/news/newsrelease/pdf/030807_1a.pdf; see Japan's Auditors: A Slight Resonance: Japa-
nese Auditors May be Getting Tougher, THE EcoNoMsST, May 31, 2003, at 77, available at http://www.econo
mist.com/node/1820738. "Resona's predicament could be just the tip of the iceberg, with other major banks
running perilously close to the minimum required capital-adequacy ratio as a percentage of overall assets, a
key yardstick of financial health. . . Should the so-called Resona shock spark a fall in bank shares and bring
down the whole stock market, the shares held by the banks could also plummet in value, further eroding the
banks' core capital in a vicious circle," the article stated. Joe Lopez, Japanese Bank Bailout Reveals Deepening
Economic Crisis, WORLD SOCIAUST WEB SrrE (May 28, 2003), http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2003/05/
japa-m28.html.
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Finally, one cannot forget the cross-border dimension to dealing with bank failures
across borders. In such circumstances, some form of coordination is logically required for
the external auditor as well as for regulators if they are to be relied on for the purposes of
supervision. For example, if one were to look at large, complex global banks operating in
various jurisdictions, there is a concerted need to coordinate the efforts of the external
auditor and indeed the differing requirements so that the risk to the home or the host can
be identified and reported to the respective regulator. Therefore, cross-border bank reso-
lution needs not only coordination between the different regulators, but also support from
the global linkages of the external auditor in such matters so that they assist the supervi-
sory decision-making process with timely information.
An expectation gap in terms of the intensity of supervision between what the regulator
expects and what the auditor intends could develop without better coordination. If the
new regulator is going to harness the use of auditors, then this gap needs to be minimized.
A regulator relying on auditors simply to do the right thing can lead to unintended conse-
quences because the professional requirements do not necessarily suggest a move towards
a more intense audit if the audit engagement and plan do not consider it necessary.
IX. Conclusion
The policy response post-banking crisis has been one of reestablishing the relationship
between the external auditor and the regulator. In many respects, this policy objective has
been fulfilled, but this paper has tried to explore whether that is sufficient. In many re-
spects, the issue is what type of supervision the regulator wants to adopt and how will
responsibilities between the regulator and the external auditor be divided? This paper has
suggested that reestablishing the relationship does not go far enough when it comes to
including external auditors in the bank supervision equation. Through the analysis of the
international experience, a number of unintended consequences arise that formally need
to be addressed to formulate a coherent and coordinated supervisory strategy clearly set-
ting out where the responsibilities of regulator and the external auditor start and stop.
It seems as though the accounting profession has seized the moment during this finan-
cial crisis, with a weak regulator licking its wounds and politicians desperate to show they
are making reforms by reinvigorating the role of auditors in financial regulation. There is
evidence to suggest that relying on the profession may not yield the outcomes the PRA
and the FCA might be expecting, in light of their enforcement strategy.
The experience of using external auditors indicates the risks of over- or under-accom-
modating their use. In the former context, a risk arises of unmonitored conflicts of inter-
est that effectively spill over into neglect of regulatory interests. In the latter context, the
risk is failing to utilize auditors to safeguard regulatory objectives by capitalizing on their
insight into the affairs of the regulated. The middle ground needs a significant level of
regulatory oversight so that the issues that arise in both contexts are incorporated into the
supervisory strategy. The auditor needs to be clearly accountable to the regulator, and the
regulator needs to monitor the work of auditors. The international experience suggests
more could be done at critical points, namely when a bank experiences distress. There is
evidence to suggest that relying on the profession may not yield the benefits the regulators
might expect. The regulator and the auditor both run the risk of forbearance in decision-
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making, and so structuring both their responsibilities to ensure early intervention needs to
be coordinated.
It is argued that unless the reforms are thought through properly, we will simply end up
by moving the regulatory deck chairs around on the Titanic, which will be to no one's
benefit. What will be important is for the new regulators to delineate clearly what each
will do and expect the other to do at various stages of supervision life cycle, during periods
of both stability and intense distress. The amended FSMA 2000 certainly enables the
PRA and the FCA to do that and address in more detail how they will rely on external
auditors to do supervisory tasks; so let's hope they seize the moment.
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